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SUMMARY 
This paper attempts to redirect the discussion on the nature and causes of apartheid. The in-
adequacies of the liberal-radical debate point to a need for a broader model to explain the 
nature of institutions which are the outcome of decisions made by rational, self-seeking 
individuals. 
The radical-Marxian position claims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the determinants 
and consequences of apartheid. However, a monocausal focus upon capital as the source of ex-
ploitation results in a defect in its explanatory power. For example, the radical-Marxian model 
is incapable of explaining the capturing of resources through the manipulation of the State by 
other interest groups. 
The liberal argument is unconvincing in its attempts to de-couple apartheid from capitalism by 
claiming that apartheid is an irrational institution, opposed by capitalists who were captives of 
political pressures. Claims that apartheid will be undermined by long-run adjustments of a 
freely functioning market find little currency in a society which is overripe for change. 
Public choice analysis is applied to broaden the understanding of interest-group behaviour and 
apartheid. In this context, the State is viewed as the focal point for the supply and demand of 
monopoly rights. Pursuit of political support to secure these rights is identified as rent-seeking. 
In the South African context, historically determined institutions and attitudes about State 
control are seen as co-determinants of an environment conducive to rent-seeking. 
Attempts by Afrikaner politicians to consolidate power generated two outcomes. First, 
nationalistic hegemony was required in order to amalgamate support among Afrikaners. 
Second, they sought legitimation by a system of rules which legislated racial monopoly 
privileges. Monopoly rights provide the means for creating racial as well as economic cartels. 
In this sense, apartheid is seen as a peculiar type of monopoly grant. 
One of the more interesting suggestions drawn from interest-group and rent-seeking analysis 
is that, unless the institutional structures within the State are changed, the problem of social 
waste from contrived monopoly rights will be continued in a post-apartheid framework. Thus, 
the proposed analysis provides an alternative, non-Marxian model which bears consideration 
by 'progressive' and radical critics of the current regime. 
Some sections of the paper, especially Section 2, may be difficult for the non-specialist to follow. 
It is for this reason that a glossary of technical terms has been included. Moreover, some 
technical aspects relating to Section 4 have been transferred to Appendices A and B. 
v 
GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL T E R M S 
Collective action problem: where the average expected value of a feasible cooperative game 
exceeds the average expected value of individualistic action (see Prisoner's Dilemma game). 
Constitutional political economy: the economic theory of the rules and institutions governing 
political and economic processes. 
Epistemology: theory of the method or grounds of knowledge. 
Equilibrium: a state from which no player has an individual incentive to depart. 
Externality: a benefit or cost captured or suffered as a consequence of other decision. 
Free riding: receiving without paying; when the action/inaction of the individual has little impact 
upon a collective effort, there is a tendency to opt out of bearing the costs of a group activity 
when there is no possibility from being excluded from the benefits. 
Forced riding: paying without receiving. 
Government (public policy) failure: occurs when the actual outcome of government processes 
fails to approximate the ideal outcome. 
Interest group theory of government: an approach based upon the empirical observation of failure 
of government attempts to correct 'market failures'; scientific based understanding of how 
government agents function under various institutional arrangements; assertion of symmetry of 
postulate of self- interested behaviour in both market and non-market setting; due to pressures 
of elections within representative democracy, public officials are apt to be manipulated by 
special-interest groups (lobbies) 
Market Failure: occurs when the actual outcome of market processes fails to approximate the 
ideal outcome. 
Negative-sum game: a game where summed payoffs at the end-game point are less than those 
at the pre-game point. 
Ontology: branch of metaphysics (the philosophy of being) dealing with the nature of being. 
Pareto criterion: the criterion according to which situation A is judged better than situation B 
if, and only if, nobody is made worse off and at least one person is made better off by the move 
from B to A. 
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Pareto optimum: a situation in which nobody can be made better off without at least one person 
being made worse off. 
Payoff: the net benefit a player gets from a given outcome in a game. 
Prisoner's Dilemma game: a collective action game in which each player orders the outcomes: 
(1) I defect, you cooperate; (2) we both cooperate; (3) we both defect; (4) I cooperate, you 
defect. The implication of such a situation is that cooperation and collective yield better (Pareto 
optimum) results than individual action. 
Private good', a good which is individually produced and consumed, whose consumption by one 
person prevents it from being consumed by another and on which it is impossible to free-ride. 
Public good: a good which is jointly produced and consumed, not subject to crowding, and from 
which it is impossible to exclude free-riders. 
Public Choice: economic analysis of the means and ends of collective choice processes within a 
non-market setting; a perspective derived from a change in focus from allocation to exchange 
as the central problem of economics, i.e., politics and the development of constitutional (social) 
contracts are the outcome of voluntary agreement among individuals. 
Public interest theory of government: view of government which assumes away self-interested 
behaviour of public officials so that their actions are based upon what is best for the general 
public. 
Rationality: the capacity for action according to enlightened self-interest, whereby actors 
compile a complete, consistent and transitive preference ordering, and choose actions accord-
ingly. 
Rent: as used by economists, a payment to a resource (factor of production) in excess of that 
which is necessary for it to remain in its current use; a surplus of returns in excess of input costs. 
Rent-seeking: actions undertaken to secure rights or entitlement to rents; where output is fixed, 
expenditures to secure these rights yield no additional products for the economy and are 
therefore wasteful. 
Strategic voting: casting a vote not in accordance with one's true preference ordering, in the hope 
of improving the chances of an option one favours. 
Zero-sum (or constant-sum): a game in which the sum of payoffs to all players is the same for the 
winning outcome. Therefore what one player gains, another must lose (the size of the pie to be 
divided remains fixed.) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
"Reform is not proceeding with the necessary dynamism. It is blocked by selfish interests 
bent on retaining obsolete procedures and privilege. The old guard is not giving up 
without a fight." 
(A comment from PRAVDA, as reported in THE ECONOMIST.) 
"Government is the great fiction, through which everybody endeavours to live at the 
expense of everybody else." 
(Bastiat, 1872: 8). 
The above quotes expose the universality and the source of what will be identified 
as a driving force behind the injustices of apartheid: State intervention stemming 
from the self-interested behaviour of political agents. Despite the extensive 
liberal-radical debate on the economic causes and consequences of apartheid, 
some issues and viewpoints have not been addressed. The absence of any direct 
public choice analysis of apartheid is a particularly important oversight in the 
debate since such analysis is especially relevant, given its application of economic 
methodology as a basis for understanding issues which have substantial political 
import. This approach can prove beneficial both in explaining the essence and 
origins of apartheid and also in providing a framework for tracking the course 
toward a post-apartheid future. 
1.1 AIMS AND SCOPE OF THE PRESENT ANALYSIS 
The basic premise of this study is that apartheid emerges from an historical abuse 
of the rights and freedoms of individuals as individuals. It will be argued that 
protection of individual freedoms will obviate the excesses associated with group 
rights, especially those which limit the rights of other groups. 
There are several preconditions to the formulation of prescriptive statements 
about change from the present to the future. In the first instance, there needs to 
be a consistent argument concerning the causal factors and the incidence of past 
and present circumstances. Secondly, it is crucial to develop a clearly articulated 
vision of the means and ends embodied in one's vision of the future. Unfortu-
nately, while there is near universal acceptance that apartheid is no longer viable, 
none of the above conditions seems to be met in the discussion of post-apartheid 
South Africa. 
The intent of this study is to investigate the nature and consequences of apartheid 
and to evaluate the vision of the future offered by the principal extra-parliamen-
tary opposition groups in South Africa. The essence of apartheid will be 
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evaluated and argued to be a particular socialist manifestation of a general 
process of interest-group politics. A fruitful application of public choice theory 
would be an analysis and critique directed toward the Freedom Charter and the 
draft constitution of the African National Congress (ANC), documents which are 
widely regarded as providing a framework for the post-apartheid economic and 
political order. Assuming the essential injustice of apartheid lies in its exploita-
tion of citizens by the State, these documents must be judged according to their 
sensitivity to this fact. An appropriate vision of post-apartheid South Africa 
should assign primacy to ways of limiting coercion, especially by the State. 
Two principal tools of public choice theory will be applied to analyse the South 
African situation. The first draws from the contractarian origins of public choice 
theory and is identified as 'constitutional political economy'. The second is 
known as 'interest-group' theory and includes rent-seeking analysis. These sets 
of tools are applied to situations where individuals make decisions in a collective 
setting. The former is concerned with the nature of the choice of the rule 
structure as in a Hobbesian or Rawlsian process of selecting a social contract, 
while the latter is involved with the process of choice of actions within the rule 
structure specified in the social contract. 
Reliance upon State intervention as a source of monopoly rights is the principal 
precondition for the type of interest-group and rent-seeking behaviour which will 
be analysed. Therefore, the nature of the political system will exert an important 
influence upon the extent and success of rent-seeking. An important corollary is 
that a general disregard for individual rights, e.g., within an authoritarian regime, 
provides a greater promise or guarantee of payoffs from individual and group 
efforts to secure monopoly rents. 
This 'instrumentalist' view describes the State as a means for a variety of interests 
groups to further their special interests. In particular, rent-seeking activities 
emerge whenever the political framework constitutes an incentive structure 
which allows for individuals or groups to gain from the acquisition of contrived 
monopoly rights. The accumulated costs (social waste) of rent-seeking go 
beyond explicit monetary returns as is evident in the social and political aspects 
of apartheid. Models of rent-seeking have previously been applied to analyses 
of mercantilism and the development of trade policy. Therefore, the apparent 
flexibility of the rent-seeking model should make it amenable to explaining how 
group-orientated behaviour by Afrikaner nationalists, in collusion with other 
interest groups, contributed to the development of the institutions of apartheid. 
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Marxian theory provides an extensive analysis of the determinants and conse-
quences of apartheid. Radical/Marxian models conceive of a peculiar relation-
ship between class and race, on the one hand, and the political structure of 
apartheid, on the other. This relationship is extended to the capitalist economy, 
the form of the State, and the structural conditions of political struggles (Wolpe, 
1988: 1). However, the mono-causal focus of Marxian analysis upon capital 
(defined in terms of the production mode) as the source of exploitation weakens 
its ability to provide a consistent explanation of other sources of social waste. An 
important oversight is revealed when considering the consequence of rent-
seeking among bureaucrats in a non-capitalist (socialist) setting. In Marxian 
analysis, apartheid is reduced to a class or racial order with an emphasis on its 
economic ends. The rent-seeking analysis proposed here attempts to place 
apartheid in a broader context where political ends, e.g., Afrikaner nationalism, 
are served by economic means, e.g., job reservation. 
An important implication of this study relates to the contentious issue of the 
relationship between the business community and the State or, in the jargon of 
the 'liberal-radical' debate, between capitalism and apartheid. The term 'racial 
capitalism' summarises a principal of the radical/Marxian perspective. However, 
an argument will be mounted which suggests that apartheid's restrictions on 
individual choice are more compatible with a peculiar form of socialism. 
Attempts to use the State to secure monopoly rights can be undertaken by any 
group with well-defined interests. Hence, the social waste of rent-seeking and 
interest-group activity can also be associated with bureaucrats, political parties, 
trade unions or consumer groups. 
A framework of individual and group behaviour will be developed with the 
following aims: 
(a) to explain the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, 
(b) to examine the subsequent development of apartheid, 
(c) to analyse the consequences of the present institutional structures, and 
(d) to examine internal contradictions which may lead to the demise of apart-
heid. 
In addition, the proposed analytical framework can also provide useful insights 
into the prescriptions outlined in the Freedom Charter and the ANC constitutional 
guidelines. However, these issues are examined in a separate paper (Lingle, 
1989). 
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As proposed above, the scope of the study carries it beyond the liberal-radical 
debate. The argument presented here is that while the liberal position provides 
an inadequate response to all the issues, the radical/Marxian arguments are too 
narrow in focus. 
1.1.1 The Radical/Marxian Perspective 
Although there is no single, monolithic model which all radical analysis relies 
upon (Wolpe, 1988), it is possible to isolate the essential components of this 
position. Most radical models assert that apartheid is a rational, class- or race-
based conspiracy; that racial domination is a condition of capitalist development 
in South Africa. However, these arguments are weakened by a myopic attach-
ment to a single causative factor, a single interest group (capital) which 'captures' 
the State. 
While it does not suggest a complete refutation of the radical position, the 
absence of class or racial hegemony within the South African context implies an 
incomplete specification of the problem at hand. In fact, there is widespread 
evidence that various groups use State intervention as a means of increasing their 
wealth, e.g., trade unions, bureaucrats, and special-interest coalitions such as 
farmers. Even within a given group there is likely to be a diverse (often 
conflicting) set of interests. These groups which are beneficiaries from State 
intervention are by no means confined to white capitalists. It is thus naive or at 
least misleading to rely upon an analysis which is stated purely in terms of capital-
labour or black-white. In each of these broad groupings there are sufficient 
differences of interests so that apartheid could not unambiguously confer bene-
fits to all members within a 'favoured' group. Further, the focus of radical/ 
Marxian class- or race-based model, despite claims to the contrary, "closes off 
concrete analysis of issues widely relevant to political analysis" (Wolpe, 1988: 2). 
And, while it may be admitted that "there is symbiotic relationship between the state 
and big business" (Stadler, 1988:22), this relationship must be seen as "contingent 
and, therefore, historically specific" (Wolpe, 1988: 58). 
1.1.2 The Liberal Response 
The liberal argument was formulated principally in protest against radical 
attempts to identify a symbiotic linkage between capitalism and apartheid. The 
emergence of slogans such as 'racial capitalism' provides a summary statement of 
these supposed links. (Rhetorical attempts to link apartheid and capitalism are 
assessed in Section 3.2). Departing from a mainstream, neo-classical economic 
framework, the liberal model depicts apartheid as an exogenously determined 
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institution. In such a framework the system is considered to be 'irrational' and is 
divorced from the endogenous behaviour and reaction of economic agents. The 
liberal riposte claims that apartheid is basically an irrational system which was (1) 
opposed by capitalists who were 'captive' to the interests of a ruling party, and (2) 
inconsistent with the long-run adjustments generated by capitalism. 
The liberal model is flawed on several counts. Firstly, in terms of positive analysis, 
it does not offer a clear explanation for the absence of an effective, consolidated 
frontal attack by white-dominated business interests against apartheid structures, 
nor does it reconcile itself with the presumed benefits derived from participation 
within these structures. Secondly, due to its particular situation within neo-
classical economics, the normative framework of the liberal model cannot 
provide potent recommendations for avoiding similar injustices within future 
political dispensations. However, public choice theory provides a means of 
investigating the economic and political outcomes which might be observed in a 
variety of the anticipated post-apartheid institutional structures. 
1.1.3 The Public Choice Perspective 
The logic of the public choice perspective parallels part of the radical/Marxian 
model since they both emphasise the interplay of endogenous (self-interested) 
forces. Thus, both reject the liberal assertion of the irrationality of apartheid. 
Apartheid is seen as a rational set of rules set within an incentive structure 
established by legal, historical and cultural traditions. However, in contrast to the 
radical/Marxian view, it will be argued that apartheid reduces the net welfare of 
all groups in South Africa. 
Additional weaknesses of the liberal and radical positions and the subsequent 
lack of a clear understanding of the causes and consequences of apartheid will be 
expanded below. Unlike the simplistic 'capture theories' of the previous argu-
ments, an analysis based upon interest-group behaviour relates to a process 
where individuals, acting alone or as members of groups, evaluate the costs and 
benefits of relying upon the State to protect or guarantee their positions. 
Many of the shortcomings of the liberal and radical models can be overcome by 
the change in methodology proposed in Section 2. In particular, this change will 
allow for a more definitive statement to be made concerning the net welfare 
effects of apartheid. The subsequent model, which addresses rent-seeking, will 
be more robust and better able to explain the behaviour of a variety of interest 
groups within a number of different political and economic structures. 
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1.1.3.1 The State as a Rent-Creating Institution 
In the neoclassical model of a competitive economy, the pursuit of rents (profits) 
is portrayed as a necessary and beneficial driving force. However, economists 
have recently come to understand that this pursuit is a double-edged sword. In 
the conventional mode, profits exist when payments to jointly used factors of 
production exceed the returns from the best (most efficient) alternative use of the 
resources. Profits are normally transitory as competition directs resources in 
response to these market impulses. Although they sometimes err, since entrepre-
neurs are directly responsible for their mistakes they have an incentive to behave 
in such a way that profit-seeking generates positive social consequences, e.g., 
greater output. 
Rent-seeking, as identified in original insights by Tullock (1967), describes a 
different process by which individuals seek to escape the competitive forces of the 
market. The most effective restraints on competition are the result of the 
manipulation of existing institutions or public policy. The maximisation behav-
iour of individuals, pursued in conjunction with state-sanctioned disruptions to 
(mutually-advantageous, voluntary) exchange, leads to social waste rather than 
social surplus. Competition for protection instituted by contrived entry restric-
tions induces resource owners to misdirect scarce resources toward acquiring, 
maintaining or avoiding the costs of such transfer rights (Colander, 1984). In 
summary, governments provide the means by which individuals or groups both 
inside and outside the government press for legislation which protects them from 
competition. 
Recent studies have identified the dynamics of racial oppression and the role of 
State intervention in advancing such behaviour. In South Africa, State coercion 
was seen as necessary to overcome the threat of competition from native Africans 
as a way of protecting the interests of whites (Bundy, 1979). Apartheid as 
legalised racism was an extreme form of protectionism whereby tariffs were 
imposed upon the use of resources, e.g., black labour, which originated outside 
the protected (white) community. 
Implicit in the proposed model is an exploitative theory of the State which seeks 
to explain the dynamics of such insidious policies. Politicians and bureaucrats are 
seen as discriminating monopolists engaged in rent-seeking. But these powerful 
and self-seeking individuals are also operating within a political environment of 
interest-group lobbying. The consequences of these joint conditions decrease the 
likelihood of political decisions reflecting the best interests of the polity. 
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The similarities of the 'interest group' theory of political behaviour with Marxian 
analysis are as striking as are the fundamental differences. Reference to Popper's 
(1960) disparaging description of the "Marxian conspiracy theory of history" is 
appropriate here. Interest group theorists agree with the Marxian assertion that 
the modern mixed economy possesses internal contradictions which may cause its 
fiscal system to collapse (Littlechild, 1979). However, rather than viewing the 
course of history as a logical sequence of class domination, their focus is upon 
individual actors and their reaction to incentives within a social context. This 
analysis seeks to move beyond the categories employed in the liberal-radical 
debate which focused primarily upon whether capitalists were/were not either 
responsible for, or beneficiaries of, apartheid. 
The radical claim that (some) capitalists were at least partial beneficiaries of 
apartheid is incontrovertible. However, there is similarly convincing evidence 
that capitalists opposed at least some apartheid institutions. In all events, 
capitalists were not the only interest group which influenced the development of 
apartheid. 
An important aspect of this analysis is the attempt to resolve the contentious issue 
of whether or not apartheid results in unambiguous welfare losses to members of 
all groups in South Africa. It will be asserted that, although members of certain 
groups may benefit from redistributions in their favour, their relatively larger slice 
will be either from a shrinking pie or one which grows at a slower rate. If such is 
the case, then one can predict unambiguous welfare losses accruing to all 
members of society. 
Therefore, the intention of this study is to specify a more general, robust theory 
of how and why interest groups are able to manipulate the State toward their 
narrow benefits. As indicated, benefits from rent-seeking are not confined to any 
single group, e.g., capitalists, or type of group. In fact, variants to rent-seeking are 
at least as widespread as the types and forms of public intervention in the 
economy. 
1.1.3.2 The Creation and Distribution of Rents Within the Apartheid 
System 
Capacity to contrive, grant and control barriers to entry is probably the most 
important political and economic tool of governments which must face competi-
tive elections. The effects of rent-seeking/granting are examined here in two 
different circumstances. The first, developed in Section 3.3 below, describes the 
manner in which the presence of interest-group and rent-seeking affects the 
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evolution of a given institutional setting. The second situation would involve 
rent-seeking within a given institutional setting. While in the former case a 
redistribution of income may be generated to benefit a favoured group of 
individuals, in the latter case less will be available to redistribute due to the 
inefficiency of restricted output and higher prices associated with it. 
Apartheid promised to serve as a means of guaranteeing monopoly returns to 
white owners of resources. This is accomplished by a contrived scarcity which 
drives up the value of white-owned resources, including their labour. Racial 
segregation and discrimination create rents by establishing an ethnic group as a 
'cultural cartel'. The normal inherent weaknesses and instabilities of cartels are 
overcome in this instance since ethnic characteristics are innate. Rents based 
upon race specific legislation provide more certain than usual guarantees. 
Presence and acquisition of these rents depend upon: (a) the availability of 
political power and (b) the collective aspect of the payoffs from the legislation. 
This study will focus upon the institutions and rules which determine the 
availability of policital power, and enquire into how appropriate limits might be 
set. 
Aside from the policies peculiar to 'separate development', other examples of 
rents generated by contrived restrictions are tariffs or import quotas, licensing 
requirements for professionals or skilled trades, control boards, rent and price 
controls, and so on. As suggested above, dead-weight losses of monopoly reduce 
total output within the institutional framework of apartheid. Thus, if rent-seeking 
were subject to stricter, constitutional limitations, real output might have been 
greater. The welfare losses of rent-seeking encountered in other countries are 
combined with the outcome of 'racial rent-seeking'. 
1.2 ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Keynes believed that" the power of vested interests is greatly exaggerated compared 
with the gradual encroachment of ideas" (1973: 384). In a reversal of his well-
known dictum that long-run adjustments must be given less credence than short-
run exigencies, he concludes his General Theory with the following remark: "But 
soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil" 
(1973:384). Now, most students of apartheid would probably disagree with such 
an assertion: although one must agree that ideas do matter in the long run, it is 
likely to be countered with an argument that institutions are critical in the short 
run in determining economic, social and political outcomes. 
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This lack of concern for the nature of institutions can be seen to be a key flaw in 
Keynes' argument. In fact, he exhibited a surprising naivete concerning the 
propriety of actions which can be expected from public officials. Harrod coined 
the phrase "the presuppositions of Harvey Road" in describing the influences upon 
Keynes which led to his naive acceptance that decision makers in a democracy 
were neutral or benign in their intent (Buchanan, Wagner and Burton, 1978:16). 
Adherence to such a 'public-interest theory of government' is rejected in this 
paper. 
Keynes was aware that fiscal activities of the State lead to redistribution, changes 
in incentives, and possibly to distortions. However, what he seemed to ignore was 
that the instruments of expenditures and transfers could and would be used 
selectively to benefit individual politicians, political parties or narrow interest 
groups. Contrary to Keynes' apparent belief, public-sector action can never be 
neutral in effect and is seldom neutral in intent. This latter observation, coupled 
with a recognition that individuals pursue their own self-interest in political roles, 
leads to a rejection of what now seems to be an especially naive model of political 
processes. 
More specifically, public choice theory rejects the implied portrayal of politicians 
or public employees as unrealistically selfless "economic eunuchs" (Buchanan, 
1978:11). The public-interest model also implies that individual preferences can 
be aggregated, i.e., that a set of social preferences is knowable. In this case 
technocrats can simply make the appropriate decisions when equipped with this 
knowledge. Policy will then be implemented which serves the aggregate interests 
of the public. 
The framework established here will reject the 'public-interest' theory. An 
alternative 'interest-group' theory of government will question both the will and 
the ability of political agents to act in the public interest (McCormick and Tollison, 
1981). A realistic framework for the analysis of political processes must account 
explicitly for the rational and egoistical motivations of the individual actors, 
especially in a rent-seeking perspective. In other words, a strong case can be 
made for symmetry in the application of the economist's model of 'economic man' 
in both market and non-market sectors (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985:50). The 
focus is upon the consequences of choices made by self-interested (rent-seeking) 
individuals within a collective or group context. Thus, the atomistic orientation 
is well suited to providing an understanding of individual behaviour within the 
institutional framework of both Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid. 
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1.3 DESCRIPTION OF RENT-SEEKING ACTIVITIES 
Rent-seeking behaviour was described in Section 1.1.3.1 above. Such behaviour 
can take place at three levels (Buchanan, 1986: 12-14). In the first instance, 
governments can contrive monopoly rights through restrictions on entry. Rights 
to earn these State sanctioned rents will obviously have value and individuals will 
bid for resources in an attempt to secure these rights. Lobbying costs, bribery, 
special preparations for examinations, etc. , reflect the loss of resources which 
occur if rights/licences are distributed through a political or bureaucratic mecha-
nism. Even if these rights were to be competitively auctioned off by State agencies 
and were themselves readily marketable, rent-seeking would still be observed. 
Receipts from auctioning of monopoly rights, e.g., licences, will now provide rent-
seeking opportunities at a second level. Given the presence of the revenues 
generated by the auction, individuals seek to gain access to the rents and the 
power associated with public employment. Rent-seeking at this level could be 
eliminated if salaries and perquisites are competitively determined. 
Nonetheless, other rent-seeking opportunities would arise in the reaction of 
individuals or interest groups who seek shares of the transfer-granting process of 
governments. These activities are common to all representative governments 
which, in principle, are subject to constitutent pressures. We would expect 
individuals to shift into (out of) activities which received (paid for) transfers of 
income or wealth distributed through the budgetary activities of the government. 
An explanation will be offered to determine the sources of losses in dynamic 
efficiency by applying the theory of rent-seeking behaviour. A framework of 
individual and group rent-seeking will be applied. 
1.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONS 
The discussion that follows draws from the wide recognition that, as a result of 
rent-seeking, the welfare losses from monopoly and regulation are larger than 
previously thought. The assertion is that use of scarce resources in unproductive 
activities, e.g., lobbying or bribery, for the capture of publicly supported transfers 
reduces the availability and raises the real price of goods and services. 
One implication of the model of rent-seeking is that the more centralised the 
State, the greater will be the expected payoff and the more active will be the 
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efforts toward securing the fruits of public interventions. Another implication of 
this model is that, due to the nature of the established political institutions in 
South Africa, any shift in the locus of power may simply alter the racial or ethnic 
mix of the targeted interest groups. The inefficiencies will remain intact as their 
source, namely, State agencies which grant monopoly rights, will be unaltered. 
Apartheid is in essence a peculiar abuse of this general problem. 
In a post-apartheid regime the principal shift could be in the form of slogans or 
personalities with no substantive change in either the nature or the cause of 
public-sector inefficiencies. It is worth noting that, even in a well-functioning 
representative democracy, interest groups will be able to decouple the politician 
from the preferences asserted by the voters. Although it is of unquestioned 
political relevance to have a shift to majoritarian democracy with a universal 
franchise, the economic and political adjustments may be less favourable than 
expected unless institutional structures which encourage rent-seeking are al-
tered. 
In other words, the beneficiaries of monopoly-source income may change, but the 
inequities and inefficiences of monopolies which are induced by public-sector 
action will remain. This prediction does not depend solely upon the degree of 
centralisation of the government or of the economy. However, centralisation will 
determine the degree of social waste from rent-seeking. This is expected since 
centralisation influences the extent and impact of State-contrived monopoly 
forces. Marx's prediction of the perpetuation of the dictatorship of one economic 
class over another may be borne out in South Africa by the coming to power of 
a different batch of rent-seekers. 
As suggested, the proposed model will be general enough to explain interest 
group and rent-seeking behaviour in a variety of institutional arrangements. 
Applicability of this model is neither dependent upon the presence or lack of 
property rights nor limited to specific organizational/functional definitions of the 
State. To be more precise, the model can explain equally well the operation of a 
bureaucracy and the openings for rent-seeking in political systems as apparently 
diverse as the Soviet Union and South Africa. 
1.5 APARTHEID AMD INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
Our principal interest in apartheid arises from its rigid and systematised restric-
tions upon individual freedoms. While the destruction of individual rights of the 
disfavoured (black) groups is more conspicuous, there are substantial infringe-
ments upon the individual rights of whites. In this sense the evil of apartheid is 
not simply a question of racial discrimination per se. The problem is even more 
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fundamental in that apartheid militates against individual choice as to whether or 
not to discriminate. 
Market analysis and many political philosophies stress the importance of the 
freedom to choose. Apartheid involves grievous offence to this ideal (which must 
include freedom of association) since it obviates individual choice to determine 
whether and how much to discriminate. One could (should) make a normative 
judgement that racial or ethnic or sexual discrimination involves widespread costs 
and should be avoided. However, the question posed here is an analytical one 
which does not seek to judge the outcomes of the individual's choices. Unfortu-
nately, voluntary choices may include the type of negative discrimination which 
is presently a legal obligation. 
For purposes of this study apartheid will take on an operational meaning as a 
'monopoly grant' to all whites as a means of broadening support towards the 
explicit end of serving the Afrikaner volk. Thus formed, whites act as an interest 
group and behave like a legally enforceable cartel. In the strict legal and moral 
environment of apartheid, while there may be some incentives to cheat on the 
cartel agreement, the considerable force of the law renders the costs of cheating 
very high. 
In the established economic jargon, then, apartheid has certain characteristics 
which are similar to a 'public good'. Specifically, there are substantial external 
benefits (costs) of being a member of the favoured group. The non-exclusivity of 
such benefits is such that they will accrue regardless of one's political or moral 
sentiments. However, since one cannot be readily excluded, neither can one opt 
out in a costless manner. Aside from the legal force, the costs of social 
ostracisation and perceived opprobrium of defectors will also help to police and 
maintain the system. In the end, no one can be free until all are free and have 
equal rights before the law. Aside from the legal restrictions which affect them, 
whites are also captive to the moral degradation associated with a white suprema-
cist regime. 
1.5.1 Apartheid's institutional Precursors 
The abuse of individual rights can be seen within the context of historical 
circumstances which define the relationship between the citizen and the State. 
Therefore, an understanding of the development of apartheid requires an 
appreciation of the complex web of historical and cultural institutions which 
stemmed from mercantilist, colonial, nationalist and frontier influences (see 
Section 4.1). The end result, though different in focus, e.g., which groups are 
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favoured, is not different in kind from many regimes in the Third World where 
State intervention in the economy serves political ends (Bates, 1981). 
1.5.2 Legal and 'Moral' Pressures to Support Apartheid 
Rent-seeking behaviour under the institution of apartheid can be expected at all 
three levels as outlined in Section 1.3. However, the politics of apartheid becomes 
inextricably linked with the economics of beggaring one's opponent. The same 
ends are met by co-opting potential opponents through promises of privilege such 
as in the case of the formation of Bantustans or township municipal councils. This 
has been accomplished by circumscribing individual rights of exchange and 
association, especially among blacks. As a consequence, this control limited the 
accumulation of the financial ability to develop and support political factions 
opposed to those in power. 
Such restrictions may be more important than direct limits upon political free-
doms since it might be argued that political rights develop from the greater 
dispersion of economic power. Increases in the economic power of an expanding 
number of individuals raises the political consciousness of individuals to protect, 
or seek freedom to improve, their economic position. The 'Rule of Law' promises 
to be more fair than the capriciousness of a 'Rule of Man', where an authoritarian 
government can take away, at whim, as easily as it may grant privilege. Broad 
dispersion of economic power is seen in this light as an important impetus for 
democracy which has been severely undermined by apartheid. 
Apartheid resembles the arguments for import substitution in that it involves the 
construction of barriers to entry to protect specific ethnic (industry) groups in 
order to secure support for the government in power. In the post-World War II 
era, politics in South Africa can be interpreted as having been dominated by 
attempts to achieve cohesion among Afrikaners by controlling the distribution of 
the largesse generated by State-supported monopoly rights. 
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2. METHODOLOGICAL AND 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
If it can be said that one's vision of the course of future events is at least 
incidentally influenced by how one interprets the past, then a whole set of value 
judgements intrudes not only upon the interpretation of history but also guides 
one to anticipate particular outcomes. Following this statement it is critical that 
the value judgements and the resulting methodology of any analysis be well spelt 
out at the outset. 
2.1 METHODOLOGY OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF NON-MAR-
KET DECISION MAKING 
The distinguishing characteristic of public choice theory is its application of 
economic methods and tools in order to understand individual behaviour within 
a non-market setting (McLean, 1987). The analysis is applied to the behaviour 
of bureaucrats, voters, politicians and interest coalitions as well as to an examina-
tion of the origins and legitimacy of governments. 
Justification for the apparent encroachment of economic analysis into areas 
which were once considered outside its domain is found in a shift away from the 
Robbinsian identification of allocation as the central problem of economics. By 
shifting the focus from allocation to (voluntary) exchange, the collective choice 
processes usually associated with most forms of democracy are then seen as 
appropriate areas for the application of the tools used by economists (Buchanan, 
1986:9-27). 
One of the criticisms of the use of the allocation paradigm is that it removes the 
human element from the economic problem. The loss of the human element 
stems from the implication of given ends associated with a known utility function 
within a necessarily static setting. Thus, a mechanical rather than human process 
is described. This objection is clearly seen within the discussion of the paradig-
matic shift which is explicitly justified within the subjectivist framework presented 
below. 
Although much of the theoretical work of public choice theory has generally 
focused upon political behaviour within a representative democracy, there have 
been attempts to extend the basic models to examine dictatorships (Cao-Garcia, 
1983), autocracy (Tullock, 1987) and mercantilism (Ekelund and Tollison, 1981). 
Therefore, application of public choice theory as a means of explaining the rise 
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and fall of apartheid does not involve stepping upon totally new ground. Analysis 
of the post-1948 political situation in South Africa, despite the existence of a 
multi-party parliament, reveals what effectively amounts to fairly authoritarian, 
one-party rule. However, future developments in South Africa are likely to be 
determined in a bargaining situation similar to the classic pre-constitutional 
(Hobbesian) phase of the evolution of the State. Such a social-contract bargain-
ing procedure might be well described in the indaba process peculiar to tribal 
customs in South Africa. 
The specific application of public choice methodology selected for this study can 
be summarised in simple terms as follows: a model of rent-seeking behaviour will 
focus upon a purposeful, potentially dictatorial individual who seeks to maximise 
subjectively determined benefits while minimising subjectively evaluated costs. 
This behaviour occurs in the process of engaging in transactions with others in the 
face of uncertainty and scarcity, such that the outcome of attempts to fix mutually 
binding contracts, when viewed collectively, cannot be judged as either rational 
or irrational (McKenzie, 1980:19). 
The methodological foundations of public choice theory are described in the 
following sub-sections. 
2.1.1 Methodological Individualism 
At issue in terms of this component is the distinction between holistic and 
individualistic explanations of social phenomena (Lukes, 1973: 110-24). Meth-
odological individualism identifies the individual as the appropriate and principal 
focus of analysis. Social institutions can be explained as formed and maintained 
by individuals to fulfil their own subjectively determined ends, framed independ-
ently from the institutions (Lukes, 1973:26). An extreme scepticism of aggregate 
measurements or of social (holistic) statements arises from this position unless 
these statements or measures are couched in terms of the individual actor. 
However, it does not require that the individual be seen as hypothetically 
removed or 'de-situated' from society. 
Social and institutional forces are seen as one of many important sources of 
influence upon the choice-making behaviour of individuals. An analytical 
statement associated with this position is that social institutions in fact satisfy 
individual ends or else they would cease to exist. A normative statement is that 
social institutions ought to satisfy individual ends. Models which operate within 
this methodological context explain the actions of particular people in terms of 
the logic of the given situation. 
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With this individualistic approach, the behaviour of organisations like the State 
or private interest groups is related to the behaviour of individual members. Such 
a viewpoint implies that the little precede the great in importance: the local is the 
basis of the general. The focus therefore is upon rational, self-interested, utility-
maximising individuals. The main actors are politicians, bureaucrats and voters. 
An important aspect of this methodological component is that individual, self-
interested behaviour is seen as an equilibrium- generating assumption. As 
indicated in the next section, the choices of individuals are understood to be 
driven by subjectively determined ends. Nonetheless, portrayal of self-interested 
individuals should not be misconstrued to rule out altruistic behaviour. Yet 
neither is altruism seen as a reliable or stable characteristic to generate equilib-
rium. 
A positivist confirmation of the appropriate nature of methodological individu-
alism is the widespread presence of 'unintended consequences' resulting from the 
course of individual actions. Although Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' is the best-
known example, both Marx and Weber understood the implications of this 
phenomenon for the process of social change (Boudon, 1982). In simple terms, 
the concept of 'unintended consequences' describes the manner in which social 
equilibria are reached through individual choices whereby the outcomes are 
other than those foreseen by the actors. Clearly, it is the disparate and 
independent actions of individuals which cause the diversion of social outcomes 
from private intentions (Hayek, 1988). 
2.1.2 Methodological Subjectivism 
O'Driscoll and Rizzo (1985:195) provide a critical element in the epistemological 
framework of public choice which is most clearly seen when combined with 
methodological individualism. Subjectivism of individual choice (values) is at the 
centre of this particular argument (for similarities with the Austrian School, see 
Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 105-115). Alternatives to be chosen among, and 
evaluation of, the options are posited to be present only in the mind of the chooser 
(Buchanan, 1969). Knowledge does not consist of objective data since the 
passage of time renders some knowledge useless because of changes in the 
institutional setting or availability of resources and technology, or simply, tastes 
of the chooser. Such changes alter qualitatively and quantitatively the form and 
ranking of alternatives. Thus, one is led to reject the concept associated with the 
allocation paradigm of neo-classical economics which posits a static set of ends/ 
goals which are applied within a known or knowable utility function. 
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2.1.3 Contractarianism 
Gordon (1976) describes the application of economic concepts of the contract-
making (bargaining) process to the broader issue of social contracts or constitu-
tions (Gwartney and Wagner, 1988; Lee and McKenzie, 1987; McKenzie, 1984). 
The importance of the shift of emphasis of economic analysis to exchange 
becomes apparent in this context. Politics is seen as a second-order process of 
mostly voluntary exchange of, e.g., votes and taxes for rights and economic goods. 
The analogy with market exchange can be extended to provide a guiding principle 
of unanimity as a means of reaching agreement on rules which govern behaviour. 
After unanimity is reached upon the setting of rules, majoritarian outcomes may 
be implemented to settle upon alternatives which are allowable within the general 
set of rules (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985: 19-32). 
The essence of this component forms the basis of Hobbesian analysis of the 
reactions of men to conditions found in the state of nature (disordered anarchy). 
Such a condition would require an extensive expenditure of resources to avoid a 
life which in Hobbes's terms would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" 
(1963:143). In the limit, all resources will be utilised for offence and defence of 
preferred goods. Within this position, it is assumed that (rational) individuals 
prefer peace to war and seek some sovereign in whom to invest the monopoly of 
coercion. The granting of such a monopoly on coercion is both a Faustian bargain 
and a tenuous situation which requires the use of evil (force) to do good. 
Accompanying this 'contractarian vision' is a specific view of the State. Following 
the logic of the unanimity principle, it is viewed as a mechanism which is designed 
to serve the ends of individuals. This mechanistic view of the State contrasts with 
an 'organic' view which conceives of society as a natural organism with each 
individual representing a part with the State as the heart (Rosen, 1985: 6). In the 
organic, holistic view, 'societal' goals have value separate from and superior to 
those of the individual. The mechanistic view associated with contractarianism 
rejects attempts to contrive social aggregates which subsume the individual to 
society. 
2.2 THE THEORY OF NON-MARKET FAILURE 
The importance of public choice analysis becomes apparent in the light of its 
principal analytical-positive contribution which might be depicted as the theory 
of 'non-market failure' (Haveman and Margolis, 1983: 515-534). One specific 
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application, namely, 'public policy failure', is seen as adding greater depth to the 
area of welfare economics. This is important since previously welfare economics 
has been concerned with the evaluation or the prescription of public-sector 
intervention as a means of correcting market failures. 
Within the public choice paradigm, individual choice-making in a collective 
setting is seen to be inconsistent with a public-interest theory of public-sector 
activity, and requires an acknowledgment of the importance of institutions in 
governing the nature of individual choice. Several applications of the problems 
with public policy institutions will be considered below and subsequently ex-
tended in Section 5. 
2.2.1 Failure of Voting to Serve as an Efficient indicator of Demand for 
Public-sector Goods 
Since Arrow's seminal work on social choice theory, the problems of voting 
cycles/paradoxes have been known to economists (Holcombe, 1983: 29-49). 
Public choice theory identifies additional defects associated with representative 
democracy as a means for individuals to reveal their preferences through a 
collective choice process. In some cases, for reasons other than intransitive 
ordering of preferences, the process of voting may fail to serve as a means of 
revealing a ' true' social welfare function. 
In particular, the weaknesses inherent to representative democracy become 
apparent with the application of self-interested behaviour to political agents. 
Representative democracy involves the election of delegated political entities 
who are meant to provide the impetus for appropriate legislation and public 
policy. However, the public choice model of vote-maximising politicians or 
political parties (Downs, 1959) suggests that the supposed link between voters' 
preferences and public policies is in fact very weak. In the first instance, assuming 
that information is a scarce good, individuals make rational choices to remain 
ignorant of certain issues, including politics in general and the position of specific 
politicians or their parties. As a consequence, voters necessarily use limited 
information in expressing their preferences when faced with a problem requiring 
some joint decision. Perhaps worse, they may rationally choose to be politically 
inactive rather than acquire sufficient information to cast a ballot. (Other related 
problems concern the decision to refrain from voting on Ihe basis of a cost-benefit 
analysis. In a large-number setting, the low probability of affecting the outcome 
reduces the incentive to vote). Without transit ive outcomes of democratic voting, 
i.e., consistent and resolved independently of the agenda setter's predilections, 
the revealed preferences will be incomplete. 
Also, the formation of distributional coalitions (interest groups) will be able to 
gain a differentiated share of economic/political power due to their political clout 
and the rational ignorance of other voters. As a result, the observed basket of 
publicly provided goods and services is more likely to reflect some amalgam of the 
preferences of politicians, their political parties and distributional coalitions than 
the public-sector equilibrium consistent with some abstract notion of a general 
will. 
2.2.2 The Economic Theory of Bureaucracy 
Since governments supply goods and services through some form of bureaucratic 
structure, the production side of public-sector activity is dependent upon the 
workings of the bureaux. The modern economic theory of bureaucracy (Ni-
skanen, 1971) concludes that bureaucracies tend to pursue their own internally 
generated maximand which may not coincide with the interests of the public. 
Specifically, bureaucrats acting as self-seeking individuals are seen as attempting 
to maximise their departmental budgets. The incentive system for bureaucrats 
does not depend upon sale of output, satisfaction of client, or any differential 
between sales revenues and costs. They then seek to improve conditions of work, 
most of which are directly linked to the size of their budget. By holding a 
monopoly of information on the bureau's activity, bureaucrats can manipulate 
the decisions of the legislature/sponsor governing their expenditures. In such a 
model, bureaucracies exhibit greater sovereignty and are much less subordinated 
to political masters. This observation will have important implications in highly 
centralised governments. 
On the other hand, social waste may occur as a result of rent-seeking competition 
to capture the salaries and non-pecuniary amenities of working within the 
bureaucracy. For example, a tendency may emerge which encourages excessive 
preparation through training at particular schools/universities in order to gain 
access to the rents associated with government posts (Tullock, 1967). 
2.2.3 The Leviathan Hypothesis 
Using a framework of positive economic theory, the expected consequences of a 
given (political) institution upon individual and collective choice and public 
interventions in the market can be examined. Public choice theory questions 
whether or not public policy intervention is capable of improving upon or 
removing the inefficiencies of market failure. The Leviathan hypothesis, which 
is one type of 'public policy failure', predicts an excessive growth of public-sector 
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activity (Forte and Peacock, 1985; Saunders and Klau, 1985; Zysman, 1983). 
Fiscal mismanagement associated with an over-sized public sector leads either 
toward pressures for collapse or momentum to change the institutional structures 
which define the political realm in order to restrain public-sector growth. 
Rent-seeking and interest-group behaviour are described as a major impetus of 
the hypothesised excessive growth of governments through the development and 
use of political powers to benefit those who run the State or support the 
government in office. Pressures from well-organised groups of constituents upon 
elected representatives seem to have an irresistible appeal, especially within a 
representative democracy. On the other hand, the model of a substantially 
sovereign bureaucracy describes an internally generated inertia for growth in 
excess of true social preferences. Even well-intentioned, public-sector interven-
tion in fact may lead to increased welfare losses, especially in the absence of 
specific institutional arrangements which seek to limit rent-seeking behaviour. 
Means might be found ,e.g., constitutional constraints, for limiting the potential 
damage done by inappropriate or excessive actions taken to limit mutually 
advantageous transactions. These issues will be examined in some detail in 
Section 5.5. Of course, the successful application of these constraints is contin-
gent upon historical and cultural circumstances. 
2.3 INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 
As has been established, the central unit of analysis will be the individual acting 
in various roles identified within institutional settings which determine incentives 
and require either individual or collective choice. The development of various 
political institutions and individual behaviour in the presence of selected institu-
tions will be modelled as a process of rational and purposeful choice. 
2.3.1 Differences and Similarities between Marxian and Public Choice 
Analysis 
The importance attached to the impact of institutions suggests some compatabil-
ity with Marxian analysis. However, the assertion of methodological individual-
ism as a basic element of the present analysis will obviate any extended compari-
son. (Expressed formally, for public choice theorists, epistemology is prior to, and 
determinant of, ontology. In the Marxian framework this process is reversed: 
ontology is prior to, and determinant of, epistemology.) 
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As implied by the following argument, the epistemological position of the public 
choice school implies that the outcome of the social choice process is non-
deterministic. Unlike in Marxian analysis, public choice theory suggests that 
capitalism might evolve in any number of unanticipated or unintended ways. This 
is supported by the description of the effect of the passage of real time upon the 
development of subjective knowledge. Real time is an explicitly dynamic concept 
which refers to the qualitative consequences of the passage of time. These 
qualitative changes involve the effects of changes in values which arise from new 
information which can be available only in the future (O'Driscoll and Rizzo, 1985: 
52-70). Classical, Marxian and most neo-classical economic analyses utilise New-
tonian time which reflects a mechanical, quantitative treatment of time. 
Real-time analysis implies that knowledge is discovered in a dynamic process, and 
is based upon subjective evaluation as to its merit or usefulness, which resides in 
the mind of each individual (Hayek, 1937 and 1945). Given the dispersal in terms 
of possession and judgement of the uses of knowledge, it is impossible to accept 
the concept of social preferences which can be knowable by a single mind. The 
process of the formation of knowledge and the subsequent impact upon individ-
ual action is summarised in the concept of unintended consequences of individual 
action. A good example of the concept of unintended consequences is the case 
of language where no one individual nor even a group could have envisaged the 
value of language or to have been able to design its efficiently evolved form. The 
evolution of institutions is seen as being influenced by the process of individual 
choice with no collective end in mind. The satisfaction of ends is an individual 
evaluation and is knowable only by the many different actors. 
On the other hand, given its dialectical arguments, Marxian analysis, though also 
non-deterministic, does imply limits upon the manner in which the development 
of institutions occurs. The progress of history is predicted to move along a 
rational, linear plane. Specifically, capitalism is expected to develop within fairly 
strict bounds, i.e., either to degenerate to open barbarism or to develop into 
socialism. 
In contrast, the explicit methodological framework of this study suggests that the 
form and evolution of institutions is independent of any specific historical or 
cultural imperatives. Although these factors are recognised as important influ-
ences, the interaction of individuals in the process of making choices (choosing 
individually preferred courses of action) is identified as the critical component of 
change. 
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More concretely, what is at stake is a different type of 'class' analysis. Marxian 
class analysis reflects upon the nature of class in relation to the mode of 
production. Public choice theory is directed towards the relationship of class in 
terms of political means. In public choice analysis there are basically two classes 
in society - those who use political means (force or coercion) to acquire wealth 
and power and those who use economic means (voluntary interaction within the 
market). The former (ruling) class lives off the labour and wealth of the latter 
(exploited) class. It is the ruling class that is 'parasitical', not the capitalists. 
Ruling classes can accumulate the power to outlast capitalists or any other such 
clique. Yet any government, whatever its form, can and will tend to be manipu-
lated by (small) rent-seeing minorities. These minorities might reflect the 
interests of political party members, bureaucrats, trade unions, industrial or 
agricultural groups, or professional associations. 
2.3.2 Individual Choice, Agent-Principal Relations, and Public-sector 
Activity 
Differences in institutional structures will alter one's roles and thus influence the 
individual's choice-making process. The principal determinants are the location 
both of costs and responsibilities, and the absence or presence of links between 
choice of action and results. The choice-making behaviour of the individual can 
be described within three roles or positions (Buchanan, 1986: 229). 
In the first ease, individual choice in a private setting describes market exchange, 
and is most familiar to economists. Given the assumption of methodological 
individualism and subjectivism, it follows that, despite the social interactions 
which might he included in such choiccs, the utility function of the individual will 
be the only one directly affected by choosing. Responsibility both for the choice 
and incidence of the effects of the choice are directly situated in the individual in 
question. 
Secondly, the individual may serve in an agency role, either choosing or acting for 
a principal. In this case responsibility is assigned to the agent for a given choice, 
but the costs of the choice are externalised. Certain rules must be established to 
constrain the a»ent from making inappropriate choices, the cost of which are 
borne bv others, l or example, in the case of a public servant with life tenure, the 
likelihood of replacement is insignificant. Therefore, the agent-bureaucrat may 
ignore the consequcnces of being identified as the one responsible for a given 
decision. Allowing for either replacement of such agents or including them in 
some pro rata .share of costs/benefits, may improve upon the choice-making 
behaviour i,f agents. 
Finally, individuals must make choices in a public or collective setting, e.g., as a 
voter or a political representative. Unlike in the previous settings, the linkage is 
broken between choice and the incidence of result. This is so, for example, since 
there is a small likelihood of one individual's vote affecting the outcome of a 
ballot, particularly in a large-number case. Further, there are few schemes which 
hold the voter accountable for the values expressed in the polling so that 
individuals may not reveal their true preferences. To complicate matters, 
outcomes of majority-rule voting generate externalities to the losing minority 
which must abide with the outcome. 
Representatives, in contrast, are able to impose policies on the general public for 
which they may not pay the full costs. Long delays in polling, combined with a 
short memory of voters (and rational ignorance as discussed below), work against 
accountability. 
Consequently, combining the uncertainty of the marginal costs/benefits of the 
outcome of collective decisions with that of the results of not being held 
accountable for indicating a preferred position, a tendency emerges which 
suggests that individual behaviour is less responsible than in a private-choice 
setting. Another problem also arises since, in a collective setting, the individual 
may act as a free-rider with respect to the outcome of a vote and rationally choose 
to abstain. 
Individuals are not likely to find themselves always or uniquely in any one of the 
positions defined above. In particular, the overlapping influence of individual 
interests casts doubts upon the prospects for reaching socially efficient solutions 
from either agency or collectivised institutions. 
2.4 INTEREST-GROUP BEHAVIOUR AND THE ECONOMIC THEORY 
OF RENT-SEEKING 
In order to avoid confusion of familiar terms used in a different analytical 
framework, it is necessary to distinguish the concept of rent-seeking from profit-
seeking. Profit-seeking involves returns which are the result of increased 
efficiency, acquisition of new knowledge and/or application of a newly discovered 
technology or resource, or just plain luck so that an entrepreneur is justly 
rewarded for providing more goods of a higher quality and quantity. Rent-
seeking implies the destruction or loss of valuable economic resources through a 
misdirection in their use which is encouraged by some institutional setting 
(Ekelund and Tollison, 1982). 
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2.4.1 Terminological and Analytical Differences 
As might be expected within any relatively new body of thought, there is some 
dissension concerning terminological and analytical matters. The title of Section 
2.4 reveals competing terms which describe the type of processes in question. 
Selection between these terms reveals an ideological loading. Public choice 
practitioners adhere to rent-seeking because of its conventional association with 
the problem of public policy failure. Within the Public Choice School, the 
tendency is to focus upon the consequences of individual choice within a 
collective context. Since rent-seeking is viewed as resource-wasting activities of 
individuals seeking transfers of wealth through the aegis of the State, it is the term 
which will be best suited for the proposed analysis of apartheid. 
On the other hand, several international trade theorists (Colander, 1984:17-32) 
refer to directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (or DUP, pronounced 
fittingly as 'dupe') to describe the activities with which we are concerned. DUP 
activities are seen as either distortion-seeking or distortion-triggered. In the 
latter case, the activities are divided between lobbying for change in policy and 
evading ill effects of present policy. Under these conditions, in the light of 
second-best starting points there may be situations where D U P activities may 
lead to welfare gains. The negative emphasis associated with rent-seeking is thus 
seen as an overstatement (Bhagwati, 1983). 
Although it is claimed that the model describing D U P activities is more general 
and perhaps more complete, the term rent-seeking suggests a more familiar 
concept to most economists and thus will be used in this study. In any case, both 
groups described above would admit that the areas of most general concern 
involve welfare losses associated with rent-seeking/DUP activities which are the 
concern of public choice analysis. 
2.4.2 Rent-seeking and Welfare Losses 
Although the origins of the concept of rent-seeking are normally traced to Tullock 
(1967), an early impetus for the examination of the economic consequences of 
rent-seeking behaviour lies in the conclusion offered by Mundell (1962). His 
suggestion was that empirical evidence revealed that welfare costs of monopolies 
and tariffs were very small, and that this observation might imply that economics 
might be somewhat irrelevant if this were the case. Mundell pointed out that the 
losses in consumer surplus associated with the Harberger (1954) triangle have 
been found to be of no great consequence (WBA in Figure 1). However, this 
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conventional method of calculating social costs overlooks resources spent in 
order to obtain or maintain transfer privileges or protection, e.g., lobbying for a 
tariff, or in attempting to avoid the costs imposed for other's benefits! More 
complete examination implies that the area of the 'Posnerian trapezoid' (Posner, 
1975) is a more complete specification of the welfare losses of monopoly since it 
includes the costs associated with rent-seeking (PcBAPm) in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1 
Given that property rights are not assigned, ex ante, to the area of potential gain 
to a monopolist, competitive bidding will take place to capture the monopoly 
rights. Eventually the entire area of Posner's trapezoid is dissipated. (Rent-
avoiding may be non-trivial as consumers or other affected individuals or groups 
may likewise expend resources to limit the consequences to them of the monopo-
lisation efforts by others). 
In an important article by Kreuger (1974), it was estimated that the rents in 
Turkish import licences alone amounted to abour 15 per cent of GDP. Posner 
estimates that the total cost of rent-seeking in the USA amounts to 3 per cent of 
GDP, which must be added to the losses identified by Harberger. 
Further application of this thesis is found in Olson's theory of the operation and 
effects of the actions taken by special interest groups (1982: 47) which predicts 
that a type of 'economic sclerosis' is likely to lead to increased political divisive-
ness. Efficiency and aggregate income of societies with extensive interest 
coalitions will be reduced owing to the cost imposed upon the many by the few. 
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On balance, it should be clear that there are net welfare losses associated with 
rent-seeking behaviour. The wastes are the result of bidding for positions of 
artificial scarcity which must be added to the higher prices and lower output that 
normally accrue to society under conditions of monopoly. 
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3. INTEREST GROUP THEORY, RENT-SEEKING 
AND LINKS WITH AFRIKANER NATIONALISM 
AND APARTHEID 
This section will examine the historical circumstances which will be argued to 
have been necessary conditions for the emergence of apartheid. The correlative 
effects of apartheid to other institutions, e.g., capitalism and Afrikaner national-
ism, will also be identified, and the operation of apartheid will be examined. 
Finally, predictions will be offered concerning future consequences of rent-
seeking in a post-apartheid South Africa. 
3.1 INSTITUTIONAL PRE-HISTORY OF APARTHEID 
Much of the history of the governing of South Africa has been characterised by 
centralised institutions devised under either mercantilism or colonialism. Various 
colonial or imperial powers imposed policies and directions for the development 
of the economy on South Africa from the outside. The rent-seeking elements of 
mercantilism are now well established and can probably be generalised to explain 
behaviour during the subsequent period of colonial expansion (Ekelund and 
Tollison, 1981). These related institutions relied upon a strong State apparatus 
which in turn provided a strong historical precedence for the high degree of 
centralisation which has been exhibited by the modern South African State since 
1948. 
Throughout South African history, there have been substantial opportunities for 
producers to bid for monopoly rights. This has been especially true in the course 
of the modern development of Southern Africa. The resulting development of 
extensive monopoly rights was both a consequence and a cause of the evolution 
of a strong, centralised domestic government. Mining capital and other large-
scale producers (particularly after 1910) were happy to encourage the develop-
ment of a State apparatus which would serve their ends (Stadler, 1987). Contrary 
to the developments related to mercantilism where the rent-seeking behaviour of 
absolute monarchs gave rise to an economic middle class, in South Africa narrow 
economic interests set the stage for the development of a special form of State. 
It is also worthwhile noting that, in general, centralised governments and their 
bureaucrats prefer dealing with small groups of powerful industrial masters. As 
a consequence, concentrated economic power and centralised political power 
complement each other in purpose and convenience. The existence of one 
confers a mutual advantage to the other. This commonality is likely to be 
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observed regardless of the nature of the organisation or functional structure of 
the State. 
These developments can be explained as follows. Based upon rational, individual 
choice, coalitions tend to form when benefits are concentrated within an identi-
fiable group. However, costs of public policies, for example, higher taxes or 
diversion of funds from other uses, which benefit special-interest groups, are 
dispersed over all citizens. The relatively small individual impacts are spread over 
a large group with otherwise divergent interests. This, combined with a general 
lack of understanding of political machinations and ignorance of the source of the 
imposed costs, militates against voter-consumer coalitions forming to oppose 
transfer to special-interest coalitions. 
Figure 2 illustrates the bargaining position between a potential or existing 
monopolist and consumers (Baysinger, Ekelund and Tollison, 1980: 241). It is 
assumed that the monopolist has much greater power in this setting as the 
individual pay-offs for the consumer to oppose the monopolist are in most cases 
small relative to the costs. Therefore, unless a given institutional structure 
explicitly limits the rent-seeking potentials, the bargaining game will result in an 
equilibrium locus at greater disadvantage to the consumer. To be specific, the 
imposition of a monopoly price, Pm, will place the consumer on a lower indiffer-
ence curve, i.e., a lower level of utility, than would the competitive price, Pc. 
FIGURE 2 
In the post-World War II period, as in other nations, South African business and 
agricultural interests sought monopoly rights since returns to rent-seeking can be 
more secure than the uncertainty of profit-seeking. Their tendency to seek rents 
was encouraged by the greater ease (lower cost) of organising due to the visible 
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and concentrated benefits accruing to a small, identifiable group. Latecomers -
smaller business interests and non-business coalitions - had a much weaker base 
for support as the costs were broadly dispersed over a larger and unsophisticated 
group. On the other hand, there were few of the necessary conditions for a 
modern democracy to place any checks upon this cosy relationship. As long as 
these narrow interests could limit the expansion of economic power in the hands 
of a potential opposition, the relationship could survive. For these reasons 
substantial inhibitions existed to reduce the emergence of a viable and effective 
political opposition, not merely among Africans, but also within the so-called 
liberal, white establishment. 
Thus, the power centre gravitated initially toward serving the somewhat exclusive 
interests of large-scale capital rather than labour since the costs of forming labour 
coalitions loomed larger than what were admittedly enormous benefits. The 
apparent exception to this, the formation of exclusively white trade unions, is in 
fact consistent with the above argument. Much lower costs of organisation and 
knowledge of pay-offs from group action led to effective and forceful assertion of 
power for the benefit of white trade unionists who pursued their own interests 
rather than that of the working class in its entirety (Hutt, 1964: 62). 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the interests of Afrikaners in 
general and black labourers in particular were not well represented as they 
wielded little economic power. Also, they suffered from the limited success of 
political organisations, e.g., the National Party's erratic political performance 
before 1948, to protect their interests. Ironically the cultural and economic 
isolation of the Afrikaner community in the recent stages of South African history 
served as an important catalyst for the future development of a group ethic which 
has served them so well, and perhaps others so badly. 
3.2 RHETORIC AND REASONING OF APARTHEID 
In order to unravel the nature of apartheid, it will be useful to re-examine some 
aspects of the debate on the economic consequences of apartheid which has 
occurred with cyclical intensity over the past several decades (Lipton 1986; 
Bromberger and Hughes 1987; Greenberg 1980; Wolpe, 1988). In this radical-
liberal debate, the radical/Marxian position posits a mutually advantageous link 
between apartheid and capitalist institutions which can be summarised in the 
term racial capitalism. Much of the evidence for the linkage was based upon 
rhetoric which has been misleading particularly for those outside the borders of 
South Africa seeking to understand apartheid. This coupling of apartheid and 
capitalism has been as unfortunate as it is erroneous; the implication is that the 
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market system tainted a free and fair society. 
Interestingly, the present regime itself has purposively added to this confusion by 
appearing as an apologist for capitalism in order to gain international allies and 
legitimacy. The apparent embrace of free-enterprise capitalism by the National 
Party since the late 1970s reflects political opportunism rather than an ideological 
commitment. For example, privatisation in the hands of the National Party 
government is probably a short-term response to problems of avoiding tax-
financed outlays to upgrade or provide infrastructure. The current regime is 
conscious of the currency of such free-market rhetoric to its targeted interna-
tional audience. 
As indicated in Section 1, the liberal argument is aimed at countering claims of a 
supposed beneficial link between apartheid and capitalism by identifying the 
logical inconsistency of apartheid with economic efficiency. The apparent neces-
sity to impose active interferences on markets suggests that free and open 
markets would have undermined the separateness which is the aim of apartheid. 
Evidence of this contention is seen in the imposition of stringent laws which was 
just as necessary to enforce adherence of the favoured group to behavioural 
schemes as was necessary to undermine the position of the disadvantaged groups. 
As suggested earlier, while the Marxian argument has been misleading, the liberal 
response has been inadequate in its explanation of the role of capital in the 
development, continuation and demise of apartheid. The following arguments 
portray capital as merely one type of interest group which could manipulate a 
given set of political institutions. 
3.2.1 Differentiating Characteristics of Capitalism and Socialism 
At this juncture, in order to unravel the capitalist-socialist origins of apartheid, it 
might be helpful to provide some definitions. However, it will not be necessary to 
offer explicitly delimited definitions. An alternative approach, in recognition of 
the need to be sufficiently flexible in order to identify real-world examples for the 
purpose of contrast, will be to identify processes and modes of behaviour rather 
than precise, idealised systems. 
In order to remove some of the political impact of of the term 'capitalism', 'market 
economy' might be an improvement (Hayek, 1988: 111). For our purposes, 
capitalism (the market economy) will be defined as a system which assigns 
primacy to the conditions which affect the individual, especially in terms of the 
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exercise of market choices. The foundations of the market economy are: (a) the 
right of private ownership, (b) freedom of contract, and (c) limited government 
(Pejovich, 1983: 1). Therefore, capitalism or the market economy is consistent 
with any non-coercive individual aims. In a system based upon individualism, 
order is seen to be derived spontaneously. Such 'spontaneous order' evolves from 
the subjectively determined actions of individuals, e.g., the market order (ibid., 
1988: 6). In such a context state intervention is eschewed in order to allow 
maximal freedom of choice (voluntary collaboration). Individuals are allowed to 
assert their subjectively chosen means towards fulfilling their subjectively chosen 
ends. Under conditions of minimal state intervention, the opportunities for 
individual enrichment through profit-seeking dominate those of rent-seeking. 
Although the following does not represent a complete definition, the essential 
foundations of most functioning socialist systems are (a) public ownership, (b) 
administrative planning, and (c) party membership (Pejovich, 1983: 6). Rather 
than allow the distribution of resources, income and wealth to be driven by 
choices made by individuals as individuals, under socialism a central authority is 
granted power to dictate a deliberate arrangement of human activity (Hayek, 
1988: 7). It is well known that the term socialism was derived as a counter-
argument to individualism which was a credo of 19ii century liberals (Lukes, 
1973). While capitalism is consistent with any non-coercive individual aims, 
socialism is consistent with nearly all collective means. This shift of focus from the 
individual to the social brings with it a tendency for interventions by the State and 
use of its coercive power to 'improve' upon spontaneous order. Under socialism, 
pressures are applied to induce individuals to relinquish their private bargaining 
strategies and to accept public (imposed) solutions. In consequence of its 
inherent bias in favour of State intervention and limitations upon private 
ownership, socialism as a system is more conducive to the socially wasteful 
behaviour associated with rent-seeking. 
3.2.2 Institutional Arrangements as Determinants of Profit-seeking and 
Rent-seeking 
As discussed in Section 1.4, the nature of legal and political institutions have an 
important impact upon individual choice. Legal and political institutions provide 
an incentive base for economic decisions. For example, in the absence of State 
intervention, it can be expected that entrepreneurial talents will be directed 
towards pursuit of risky market ventures to seek profits. Alternatively, an 
institutional bias in favour of public intervention provides the inducement for the 
same entrepreneurs to solicit rents in the form of State-enforced monopoly 
grants. Although rent-seeking involves costs, the fact that the assignment of 
monopoly rights provides a secure flow of returns will provide a path of least 
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resistance. As indicated above, rent-seeking is more likely to be observed in states 
where economic decisions are centralised, as under socialism. 
However, the extensiveness of public intervention in markets may not be contrary 
to the functioning of certain variants of capitalism. For example, the form of 
industrial capitalism which characterises much of South African industry gener-
ates opportunities for pay-offs from rent-seeking. Private ownership of capital in 
many industries is mixed with substantial regulatory protections against compe-
tition. Manv of these regulations are more influenced by political rather than 
economic reasoning. 1 lowevcr. from an operational standpoint the nature of 
ownership (private or public) is less important than are the monopoly protec-
tions. In this sense these firms may act little differently to State-owned firms in 
the Soviet Union, for example. Based upon the analysis offered here, retributive 
demands for the public takeover of the so-called private monopoly structure of 
South African industry are misguided. Nationalisation of the firms which occupy 
the 'commanding heights of the cconomy' will do little to change the nature of 
their production. 
If the real purpose behind the complaints against South Africa's industrial giants 
is to transform these firms to be more responsive to consumer demands, then the 
State institutions and rules which protect these firms must themselves be altered: 
effective competition must be restored. State ownership cannot aim to improve 
competition because of it-« exclusive claims both on resources and sales and the 
fact that State monopolies are sheltered from the chilling winds of competition. 
T-or reasons addressed el.-ew here, neither can State firms be expected to produce 
optimally. 
However, entrepreneurial or free-enterprise capitalism requires less State inter-
vention in order for liims to cjrry oui the discovery process which can only be 
by market transactions. State intervention in markets is designed to 
: competition or provide exoUisi\ e rights i-; production. Regardless of the 
" of these measures, they result in distortions in market signals. The 
'; moves towards privatisation, deregukitu n „nd reform of the socialist 
" i a widespread consensus (though not articulated as such) on 
ireet economic decisions i ivn ••-••'.•-^ •(.•kiiig toward profit-
centralised interferences toward decentralised market processes. 
Pedigree of Apartheid 
' unfortunate result of the radical attempt to link apartheid to 
prey to their sloganeering. Acceptance and use of slogans by the radical camp 
occurs despite often internally inconsistent content. The term racial capitalism 
is a good example of deceptive and contradictory use of language as argued 
below. 
Although slogans are of little intellectual value, apartheid might be better 
described as racial socialism (Lewis, et al, 1986). This claim is made on the basis 
that apartheid involves social(ist) obstruction of activities as the means of 
meeting racial(ist) ends. Support for this claim is based upon the contention that 
the institutional structure of the State lies at the core of the injustices of apartheid 
(Burton, et. al., 1986). The implication of this rejoinder is that the nature of the 
State and abuse of its coercive power needs to be changed rather than to 
eliminate market forces and private property (Hutt, 1964). Therefore, the 
contradictions between apartheid and the market system (capitalism) are dys-
functional and render the two incompatible. On the contrary, a greater compati-
bility and consistency of both means and ends is observed between apartheid and 
socialism. 
The confused coupling of apartheid with capitalism stems in part from the radical/ 
Marxian interpretation of the essence of the economic problem. Unlike other 
schools of economic thought, the Marxian assessment places the notion of class 
struggle or the mode of production at the centre of economic analysis. In this 
context it is logical to contrive a conspiracy theory where (white) capitalists or 
neo-colonial powers 'capture' and manipulate the State. 
Thus, the term racial capitalism is meant to identify an especially onerous 
variation of the inherently unjust system of capitalism. Following the radical logic, 
capitalists are able to thrive by adding to their list of dupes not only the benighted 
proletariat but also a racially orientated group of cohorts. These partners are 
included as beneficiaries in the process of the unrelenting reproduction of the 
relations of production. In particular, an alliance with white workers is to serve 
as a means of holding the larger number of black workers in bondage to the 
alienating production system. Exploitation of the mass of (black) workers is 
maintained by co-optation of a smaller, better organised (white) minority. 
3.2.4 Economic Consequences of Political Power: Apartheid's Social 
Interference with Individual Action 
Sober reflection, however, suggests that the characteristics of apartheid are more 
consistent with centralised, collectivist states and socialism rather than free-
the implementation, and the results, of apartheid rather than the qualitative 
intentions of the policy. It is noteworthy that most of the economic monopolies 
could be maintained without apartheid. 
Consider the following spectrum of public policies which distinguish capitalism 
from socialism. At one extreme is a minimal amount of State interference/ 
coercion within a system of voluntary exchange and private property rights. (This 
is consistent with most Marxian definitions of capitalism since private ownership 
is the principal tool for the control of the means of production.) At the other 
extreme is a situation of maximal State intervention and planning with sharply 
attenuated property rights due to State ownership of the factors of production. 
The intersection of various policies within the apartheid regime is evaluated 
below. 
3.2.4.1 Social Engineering 
Social engineering is part and parcel of apartheid and is also an integral 
component of the socialist enterprise. An assessment of the intentions behind 
social engineering is unnecessary for it to be considered a part of a social(ist) 
project. What may emerge is a subjective evaluation of the programme, e.g., 
national socialism (fascism) is bad while communism is better. Nonetheless, this 
connection stands even if one is forced to accept that apartheid involves a 
distasteful form of social engineering. In all events, socialism in general, and 
apartheid policies in particular, aim to direct social development and militate 
against that freedom of choice by individuals which is claimed to exist under 
capitalism. 
3.2.4.2 Market Intervention 
Another consideration concerns the extent of and predisposition towards State 
intervention in the the process of market exchange. The efficient operation of 
capitalism requires free exchange within a system of private property rights. In 
South Africa, in contrast, all holdings of property have been effectively 'nation-
alised' within the policy of apartheid. This claim is based upon the nature of the 
corpus of laws which has placed severe restrictions not only on the sale of 
property but also on labour and capital movements. In a very real sense the State 
has dominated all market transactions to an extent not encountered in other 
mixed economies. Although many of the policies discussed below exist in other 
mixed economies, most have a particular role within the apartheid system. 
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3.2.4.3 Labour Markets 
Labour as a form of property (human capital) transacted in the labour market has 
also been 'confiscated'. Not until recently, with the removal of job reservation 
legislation and influx control, have workers had exclusive legal rights over the sale 
of their labour. In practice, their mobility continues to be problematic. It should 
be noted that some socialist regimes have also enforced restrictions on individual 
choice of jobs, especially, though not exclusively, through centralised planning. 
3.2.4.4 Markets for Land and Land Resources 
Transactions concerning land likewise have been conspicuously circumscribed by 
Group Areas legislation. Ownership rights are subject to the authoritative 
designations of the government, especially in the African townships and home-
lands. As a consequence it is as though housing were a nationalised commodity. 
The massive landholdings of the State are likewise incompatible with a capitalist 
system which relies upon broad rights of ownership. 
Less obvious and contrary to popular understanding, the mines have in effect 
been 'nationalised'. Mineral rights are detached from land ownership such that 
one can only sink a mine after paying licence and registration fees and eventually 
taxes/royalties on production. At present Anglo-American and its competitors 
are simply (admittedly well-paid) management firms which operate in the place 
of a (usually overpaid) State bureaucracy. 
3.2.4.5 Obstruction of Competition and Price Adjustments 
Free exchange in South Africa faces further restrictions in the form of numerous 
agricultural Control Boards. (Interestingly, the success of the reform of Chinese 
and Hungarian socialism is a consequence of the elimination of the inefficiencies 
stemming from the control of agricultural markets!) There are numerous other 
legal restrictions on market activities including exchange and capital controls and 
state monopolies. Hardly the stuff of free-wheeling capitalism despite recent lip-
sfervice paid to privatisation. 
3.2.4.6 Concentration of Industry 
It is recognized that the peculiar form of capitalism in South Africa is not beyond 
reproach. The presence of cartels. State- sanctioned private monopolies and the 
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apparent generally favourable treatment of (especially large-scale) capitalists has 
served the radical's conspiracy notion very well. Yet it is just this cosy sort of 
arrangement that stifles capitalism or at least entrepreneur-guided free enter-
prise. It is ironic that the opponents of the present regime have accepted the 
government's strategic propaganda which seeks to identify South Africa as a 
bastion of free-market capitalism. In playing along with such a charade, the 
government actually serves the strategic purposes of those opposition groups 
who would reject decentralised market decisions in favour of a centralised or 
planned economy. 
3.2.4.7 Apartheid as an Inefficient Tax 
Aside from welfare losses associated with normal monopoly-seeking behaviour, 
South Africa suffers from a peculiar form of rent-seeking behaviour which 
involves a well-developed and rational political entrepreneurship. The outcome 
of the policies generated by the political entrepreneurs has had the effect of a 
(inefficient) tax placed upon the population at large which redistributes income 
towards the ruling party, State employees and other recipients of State largesse. 
In the sense that taxes reduce the purchasing power of the 'taxed' individuals, 
apartheid can be seen as a tax. However, it tends to be highly inefficient in as 
much as it has led to a reduction of, or limitation upon, the potential tax base. 
Without querying the justness of taxing certain groups as a means of supporting 
the institutions of apartheid, it is clear that the present system is far from optimal 
in terms of efficiency. 
3.2.4.8 Apartheid and Class Struggle 
Thus, it can be argued that South Africa's maldistribution of income and wealth 
so frequently cited (Knight and McGrath, 1977; McGrath, 1983) may have little 
to do with capitalist exploitation per se and instead stem from selective and 
purposeful activities of individuals or coalitions (of all types or classes) to 
encourage intervention by the State to benefit such diverse groups as (white) 
trade unions, business interests, civil servants, university lecturers, and so on. 
Hardly the stuff of class struggle which in its pure form should predict that the 
interests of rural Africans would be pitted against urbanised Africans. Apartheid 
is not a function of class struggle as such. Instead it reflects the outcome of a 
special type of rent-seeking which in turn establishes secondary opportunities for 
further rent-seeking. In fact, one of the intentions of apartheid was to replace 
'class' or worker hegemony of (white) trade unionists by racial hegemony (Welsh, 
1974: 274). 
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3.2.5 Political Consequences of Economic Power 
A further argument is in concert with, but goes beyond, the liberal critique of 
apartheid. This position suggests that apartheid relies upon a procedure of 
'beggaring thy neighbour' as both a means and an end. This relationship can be 
best understood by examining the bond between economic and political power. 
It will be argued here that the demand for political rights arises out of the 
emergence of economic power. The demand for political rights is seen as 
increasing in tandem with increases in private-source wealth and income. Politi-
cal power serves as a means of securing one's economic position from arbitrary 
confiscation. If this is so, the impoverishment of the groups excluded through 
apartheid would set bounds upon both their means of, as well as their incentives 
for, developing political power. 
Naturally a policy which impoverishes a significant portion of the population has 
costs even to its perpetrators. In simplistic terms, the shrinking of the overall size 
of the economic pie implies that even those who maintain the largest slice will be 
worse off than with an enlarged pie. However, the costs to the advantaged group 
tend to be invisible since they may simply involve foregone opportunities of 
economic growth. The impact only impinges upon the protected group as 
declines in growth rates become conspicuous. As discussed earlier, Olson's 
theory of group cohesion (1965) would predict that the decline in economic 
growth forces a reappraisal of the benefits of continued support. Such reap-
praisal would be most critical to the decisions of the many unwilling beneficiaries 
who toed the line principally to avoid the costs of defection, e.g., social ostracism, 
moral opprobrium and/or legal prosecution. 
As Hirschman (1970) predicts, the decline of economic growth in the 1980's has 
generated pressures for more vociferous voicing of opposition. Likewise, many 
nominal supporters of the government have begun either to demand an under-
taking of negotiations with forces which oppose National Party policies or else 
simply to defect to other political organisations. Cynics who discount the recent 
acts of goodwill from South African business leaders should recognize that 
several conditions had to be met before they could participate in a dialogue with 
extra-parliamentary, opposition groups. The most obvious, yet most often 
overlooked, point is that even now there is no monolithic structure which defines 
the opposition. Earlier attempts at negotiations would have taken place in 
relative isolation. Negotiations are pointless if the bargaining partner has 
uncertain support and is unable to muster a consistent political will. Only very 
recently have consolidations of the forces in the townships led to the emergence 
of a significant, directed political force. 
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A final condition for disassociation with apartheid has been noted above in terms 
of the individual costs and benefits of participating within or challenging the 
institutional structure (Olson, 1965). The expected benefits derived from defect-
ing from or challenging the legal apparatus must offset the anticipated costs, legal 
and otherwise, as a precondition for action against even the most morally 
offensive set of rules. A critical mass has finally been reached in South Africa 
where all of these conditions are in place. Isolated attempts to challenge the 
system in the past would have involved costs in excess of the payoffs derived from 
linking up with groups which reflected the broad interests of the majority. There 
are even now numerous pretenders for this distinction. Previous claims were even 
more contentious. 
3.2.6 Apartheid as a Variant of Socialism 
The most important result of the above reasoning surfaces in the contention that 
the nature and consequences of apartheid lie within the social(ist) interferences 
with free exchange whether in terms of economic, social or political activities. In 
short, the types of restrictions placed upon individual freedom of choice are 
necessary for, at least more compatible with, a socialist programme. For example, 
influx control still exists and is unchallenged as a socially productive policy in the 
USSR. In China there are no longer explicit laws which limit urban influx; 
however, urban accommodation is effectively controlled either by 'work units' or 
municipal authorities. Likewise, squatting in urban areas is strictly prohibited in 
both countries. 
It is clear that influx control can be, and often is, based upon factors other than 
race. However, such control (for whatever reason) represents an authoritarian 
restriction on individual rights which is normally accompanied by some limited 
redress available to the individual. Such offensive policies should be discredited 
as a matter of principle, not simply on the basis of special (racial) pleading. It is 
an interesting and illuminating test to ask South Africans if they consider it 
socially just to apply influx control if based upon criteria other than race. 
Advocates of a market economy are certain to answer in the negative. 'Progres-
sives', for example, those associated with the United Democratic Front, are likely 
to answer in the affirmative. 
The chronically disproportionate distribution of power in South Africa can be 
better understood by rejecting the mono-causal attachment of blame to a single 
interest group, e.g., capital. In fact, the ability of special-interest coalitions to 
utilise and direct the coercive powers of the State for their narrow benefits is a 
condition found in most State structures. Afrikaners have found it to their group 
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advantage to impose racial hegemony through legislative and economic struc-
tures which were designed to confer selective economic benefits. Their success 
was based upon an ability to direct the machinery of the State for the benefit of 
whites. Those who suffered the most should understand that these excesses were 
generated through misuse of centralised political power. It should be clear, 
therefore, that strict delimitations of central power will best serve the interests of 
the oppressed groups in a post-apartheid order. 
It is undeniable that some measure of the excesses of apartheid were the result 
of actions taken in collusion with the State in order to promote self-enrichment 
of some capital owners. (The same impulse - to restrict competition - however, 
was present in attempts by skilled, white workers to limit the access of unskilled, 
black workers to the labour market.) For the most part capital owners simply 
responded to the incentives established by the political structure. Similar abuses 
of power and injustices associated with contrived monopoly rights are likely to 
emerge from the self-aggrandizement or enrichment of any special-interest 
coalitions which could capture political power. If this assertion is correct, then the 
removal of the injustices associated with apartheid requires a change in the 
incentive structure of the political institutions to remove the temptations for rent-
seeking and the authoritarian abuse of power. 
The argument for institutionalised restraints on political structures to inhibit the 
subsequent use of the State monopoly on coercion represents a consistent 
argument which should be examined by any group which would wish to rule South 
Africa. The issue at hand should not simply address the racial content of 
authoritarianism nor seek to attenuate private property rights. Focus should 
rather be upon institutional and constitutional means of eliminating authoritari-
anism and the sources of power accruing to interest groups. 
Ironically, various attempts to portray the present regime as fascist (Bunting, 
1964; Simson, 1980) are relevant in establishing the compatibility of apartheid 
with socialism. Characterisations of South Africa as a fascist state have great 
symbolic power. On the one hand, it is intended to inspire an emotive opposition 
to the present regime. One the other hand, a type of rhetorical reductionism is 
implied such that any set of ideas which are contrary to the 'progressive' 
opposition forces might be associated with fascism. This reductionist argument 
represents another attempt to connect apartheid with capitalism. 
Although the notion of South African fascism is disputed by Adam and Giliomee 
(1979), whichever definition is selected for fascism, i.e., whether emphasis is 
placed upon repression or enforced ideology, these operations require massive 
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State intervention. In particular, monopoly capitalism and protection of nomi-
nally private firms is enforced through the State apparatus to the detriment of 
individual entrepreneurial initiatives. The hindrance of profit-seeking entrepre-
neurs reveals a tendency which is anathema to the market economy. While the 
analysis of South African fascism is unconvincing, the robustness of such claims 
should simply provide support for the apartheid-as-(national)-socialism argu-
ment presented here. 
3.3 THE NOTION OF AN AFRIKANER NATION, UNITY, AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF APARTHEID 
The ascendancy of a particular national identity involves a more complex issue 
than that associated with the formation of the typical distributional coalitions 
described above. Nonetheless, opportunities for rent-seeking at all three of the 
levels discussed in Section 1.1.1 will be examined here as they served the 
movement toward greater unity among the Afrikaner people. 
Apartheid serves as a means of furthering both cultural and political nationalism 
for Afrikaners, but the consequences of political nationalism are of more interest 
here. Nationalism results in demands for the shifting of international or inter-
ethnic income or wealth. Changes in, or maintenence of, such policies require 
real expenditures of economic resources by the nationalist group. The resulting 
nationality or membership of an ethnic group becomes a form of collective or 
public capital (Breton, 1964). 
Rewards or payments out of this capital are disbursed in both monetary and non-
monetary forms. Monetary rewards to members are most often in the form of 
relatively high-income jobs. Programmes and policies under a nationalist regime 
are often selected on the basis of the number of high-income jobs which will be 
generated for the favoured group. However, such policies will yield a lower 
national income than would occur using other, more strictly economic, criteria. 
Nationalist policies are not designed to, and cannot, maximise social income. Of 
course, it is the anticipated redistributional effects that provide the offsetting 
rationale for this otherwise irrational proposition. 
The basic institutional framework inherited by those Afrikaners who came to 
power in 1948 was moulded by a variety of historical circumstances. It is ironic 
that there is no striking tendency on the part of the Afrikaners for dependence 
upon a strong and centralised government until the 20th century. However, the 
same strain of individualism and self-preservation is consistent with, and can be 
seen as, the root of apartheid (Louw and Kendall, 1986: 20). 
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Meanwhile, from 1910 to 1924 and subsequently from 1939 until 1948, Afrikaner 
nationalists found themselves out of political office - a factor which exacerbated 
their subservient position in the economy. Their sense of self-interest gave rise 
to a group identification of common interests. This is justified by Olson's Law 
(1965) which describes a logic of collective action. However, it is not common 
interest which is viewed as the cement of the collective action. According to 
Olson, group cohesion is based upon the agreement of subjectively determined 
preferences of the individuals which are in a (tentative) state of agreement with 
the ends of the group. Collective action is contingent upon the satisfaction of 
private needs. 
Group cohesion is strengthened by the creation and control of 'selective incen-
tives' which are payoffs available only to members of the group. There are those 
who will have the incentive to act as 'free riders' since the burden of a single 
individual is of little relative significance in a large-group setting. Alternatively, 
there are 'negative selective incentives' which impose costs on those who violate 
the group ethic. Ultimately, it is the weighing of private costs and benefits of 
participation which determines the individual attachment to a group cause. 
An extension of this analysis can be seen in the light of Hirschman's (1970) 
description of the options which group members must choose between: exit, 
voice or loyalty. Therefore the dynamics of group cohesion is viewed as a 
situation in which these options are balanced against each individual's personal 
calculations. At present the National Party is finding a growing proportion of 
whites, and particularly its own members, selecting the first two options. This 
point will be raised further in Section 3.4.2 in a discussion of the increasingly 
aggressive opposition of commercial interests to apartheid rule. 
Afrikaner political entrepreneurs, anticipating the payoffs (rents) of acquiring 
power, effectively linked individual to group survival as a source of political unity, 
and attempted to give operational value to the identification and definition of the 
volk. In operation, belonging to the volk became a public good. Adherence to 
the group ethic was derived in part on the basis of the real and psychic costs of 
remaining outside the group relative to the expected improvement in terms of 
one's survival and position. This was joined by the sense of obligation or duty of 
the membership of the identified group on the basis of the argument of a shared 
cultural background and values, including an appeal to strong religious ties. 
Expected payoffs from political cohesion provided an apparently irresistible 
incentive. 
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Exploitation of this political opportunity worked because it was seen to provide 
net benefits to virtually all members of the group. Of course, numerous other 
factors, including the changing demographics of the white population, for 
example, relatively higher birth rates and the age distribution in the Afrikaner 
community, a transformation toward a more urbanised Afrikaner population, re-
strictions upon the franchise, perceived external threats both to the Afrikaner 
community ('swart gevaar' and immigration) and to South Africa (communism), 
all combined to provide the impetus to join an interest coalition which promised 
to serve the Afrikaner nation. The (Afrikaner) nationalist cause won the day and 
the power in the election of 1948 (Stultz, 1974: Chapter 7). 
Rent-seeking by self-interested politicians helped to forge a coalition which took 
over the political apparatus which was to be centralised in order to deliver the 
promises which would ensure continued political hegemony. Changes in immi-
gration laws, naturalisation procedures and rights of representation served as a 
means of checking a longer-term threat to political unity (Stultz, 1974:160). The 
explicit use of the term apartheid appeared as a policy statement of the Afrikaner 
nationalists as early as 1947 (Stultz, 1974:137), but it is well established that the 
question of race as an important economic and social issue was prevalent in 
political debate throughout South African history, The implementation of 
apartheid as a coherent and rigid legal policy can be seen as a partial manifesta-
tion of a need to expand the basis of coalition to include all whites in a matter of 
shared interests. 
3.4 CAUSES OF THE DEMISE OF APARTHEID 
Assuming that the present government depends upon the support of capital for 
continued survival, a break in this marriage of convenience would challenge the 
viability of the government and its favoured institutions. On the other hand, 
problems of sustaining a high level of economic growth for rising public expendi-
tures will be an impetus toward the demise of apartheid. 
3.4.1 The Contradictions of Apartheid and Competitive Processes 
Competition is a crucial component of capitalism. It is through competition and 
entrepreneurial action that profits, the guiding element of capitalism, are gener-
ated. Policies which have curbed competition in South Africa were not designed 
to obviate profits per se. In fact, these restrictions do protect a particular group 
of capital owners. It is understandable that this opportunity has led to some 
capitalists entering into a 'conspiracy' with the apartheid regime. However, it is 
clear that business interests have often clashed with apartheid policies and 
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institutions so that it is erroneous to claim a clear, consistent line of mutual 
dependency. 
Restrictions upon competition, e.g., assignment of statutory monopoly rights, 
hinder the efficient functioning and beneficial results of a market economy. 
State-sanctioned monopoly rights have been both a means and an end of 
apartheid. It is important to note that these results are similar to the inequities 
and inefficiencies which are generated by the huge, monopolistic State interna-
tional trading companies of the socialist nations. 
Consistency of stated intentions aside, State-sanctioned monopolies and other 
curbs on competition are unquestionably in closer accord with socialism. Despite 
claims to the contrary, socialised monopolies are even less likely to react to the 
demands of the people due to the coercive capacity of the State to make up 
shortfalls through raising taxes. Private monopolies, which face tighter budget 
constraints, though reluctant, will have to abide more closely with market 
impulses. 
In this light, the most appropriate way to remove the monopoly power of capital 
is to reject State intervention rather than to rely upon it as a cure. As argued 
above, State intervention is the real culprit in creating and protecting monopoly 
whether in a socialist or a mixed economy. The simple recourse is to reduce the 
powers of coercion vested in governments: to reduce the State's capacity to 
sponsor monopoly capitalism and to encourage instead, entrepreneurial capital-
ism. Limiting State interference in the economy is all the more credible in view 
of the admission of various socialist regimes of the need to re-introduce the 
discipline of the market into their economies and to decentralise economic 
planning. Interventionist policies aimed at restraining individual initiative and 
market forces have proved to be failures. These failings are seen in terms of the 
costs of foregone economic growth, and particularly in terms of the loss of 
consumer sovereignty. 
3.4.2 Shifting Position of Capital 
As described above, as coalition partners business interests can choose to opt out 
of the coalition, voice disapproval in order to seek remedial changes, or simply 
remain loyal (Hirschman, 1970). Capitalists have found it be increasingly 
disadvantageous to have even remote association with the government's apart-
heid policies. The sources of pressures which have led to the selection of the exit 
and voice options will be examined in this section. 
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There are various sources of the reduction in the net benefits of coalition which 
will lead to a breakdown in the increasingly unhappy, always tenuous, union 
between business and the government. Despite the ad hoc Carlton and Good 
Hope conferences initiated by the government in 1979 and 1981 respectively, 
these tensions prevail principally due to bureaucratic inertia (Stadler, 1987:166). 
The shifting winds of international economic activity have reduced the absolute 
economic power of big business. Sanctions and the loss of international respecta-
bility have raised the international ante. Continued association with the current 
regime has also led to increasing domestic costs for the local business community. 
Rising taxes and guilt by association as an apparent economic cohort generated 
considerable pressure to disassociate with or demand reform from the govern-
ment. Capitalists see a need for the development of conditions conducive to an 
expansion of the domestic economy. Improvement in the domestic economic 
environment has become more urgent as earnings in export-orientated activities 
evaporated for economic or political reasons. 
On the other hand, small businesses show promise in terms of a growing relative 
importance in the economy. Some restrictive or regulatory policies which may be 
envisaged as a boon to big business may be a bane to small, newly emerging firms. 
Entrepreneurial openings for firms to act as rent-creators rather than rent-
seekers serve further to weaken the cooperation between business and the 
government. Manpower needs, especially for more skilled labour, have also been 
an important impetus for change in labour policy. 
Finally, the absence of an identifiable and viable political opposition provides 
business enterprises with no means to counter government policies found to be 
against their interests. However, an extra-parliamentary political opposition 
likely to be an important player in the development of future institutions has 
emerged. Producers and other interest coalitions will seek greater visibility in the 
camp of this opposition in order to establish contacts which will reduce antici-
pated future costs of any transformation or reform of the South African economic 
and political scene. 
3.4.3 The Effect of Interest Coalitions upon Economic Growth 
Later work by Mancur Olson (1982) provides an alternative argument to the 
source of the fiscal and/or legitimation crises of the State. The analysis concerns 
a socio-political model of economic performance. The consequence of collective 
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action within a macroeconomic framework is developed as an expansion on his 
work on the logic of collective action discussed above. Substantial historical and 
empirical support is offered in support of his hypothesis (Mueller, 1983). 
Olson concludes that the dead-weight effects of increasingly ubiquitous distribu-
tional coalitions or special-interest groups will eventually generate a slowdown in 
economic growth due to the increase in rigidities which are introduced into the 
economy and the polity. The ubiquity of these coalitions arises from increased 
political sophistication and improved communication, among other factors. 
The weakening of the economic growth potential emerges from a reduction in the 
extent of what Hicks identified as the 'flexprice' sector of the economy (Olson, 
1982: 209). Political support for distributional coalitions will allow them to 
exercise a monopoly position and to set prices above market-clearing levels. 
When shocks occur to the economy these coalitions will resist adjustments or tend 
to be slow in doing so. The loss in resilience in the economy is expected to 
exacerbate business cycles and build in a high and rising non-accelerating 
inflationary rate of unemployment or 'Nairu' (Ibid.: Chapter 7). Ironically, at a 
certain level of pervasiveness of distributional coalitions, the redistributive effect 
of transfers to special interest groups will dominate and possibly offset the 
intended effects of redistributive tax policies. 
The excessive rigidities imposed by general rent-seeking behaviour and by 
apartheid in particular seem ultimately to have restrained the growth of the 
South African domestic economy. 
The urgent need for establishing conditions which will encourage economic 
growth and recovery will be likely to induce reform of certain economic and 
political institutions. Politicians within the ruling party may seek entrepreneurial 
advantage and either alter or sell-out and abandon their present loyalties. 
However, unless there are limitations placed upon the opportunities for the 
formation of rent-seeking distributional coalitions, the only change will be in the 
distribution of the impact. This is rather like the logic of transference of pain 
where one smashes a thumb to forget about a headache. A more appropriate 
course of action would appear to be to address the sources of the agony, that is, 
to propose radical transformation of political institutions to limit policies which 
serve special interests. 
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3.5 REDISTRIBUTION AND RENT-SEEKING IN POST-APARTHEID 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Any post-apartheid government will have to face enormous pressures to redis-
tribute wealth and income. However, many long-term problems will be unaf-
fected by such policies. The problem of distributional coalitions and enlarged 
bureaucracies is likely to encourage zero-sum distribution which will offset much 
of the redress-orientated reforms which might be implemented. 
Economic efficiency (growth) will be hampered since distributional coalitions will 
seek to maintain their strength, e.g., by opposing new technologies or changes 
which, though efficient, would shift resources away from their control. Such 
interest-group organisations will form to maximise the individual member's 
benefit through exclusive membership, and to minimise the differences in both 
the income of members and the value of membership to them. Trade unions, 
industrial or agricultural lobbies, educational associations, or legal and other 
professionally licenced groups, all operate along these lines, regardless of their 
stated objectives. 
Political and economic processes will be retarded due to the innate conservatism 
of distributional coalitions. Their slothful response to changing economic and 
political exigencies will tend to be reflected in governments which rely upon them 
for support. Following Olson's socio-political model of economic growth, (1982), 
in the absence of traditional or explicit restraints on the extent of demands which 
are made by emerging distributional coalitions, enormous damage will be done to 
the self-adjusting mechanisms of the economy. Under representative democracy 
there is little resistance to such pressures since elected governments will resist the 
pressures to serve these groups at their own peril. 
One of the dominant models proposed by extra-parliamentary political groups 
for the post-apartheid political structure is that of a unitary, centralised state. 
Niskanen's theory of budget- maximising bureaucrats (1973) suggests that the 
attendant increase in the power and centralisation of bureaucracies is bound to 
serve as another source of increased costs and rigidities. The additional costs will 
go beyond the administrative costs of salaries, perquisites and pensions. Greater 
losses are likely to appear as a consequence of a slowdown in economic and 
political decision-making which are associated with extensive bureaucratisation. 
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4. A NORMATIVE SKETCH OF POST-APARTHEID 
POLITICAL ECONOMY: TYPES OF DEMOCRACY 
As implied in the above arguments, especially in Section 2, governmental 
structures and institutions exert an important influence upon the degree of 
interest group and rent-seeking behaviour. It is therefore crucial to develop a 
clearly articulated vision of the means and ends embodied in one's vision of post-
apartheid South Africa. For example, if the implications of a public choice 
analysis of apartheid are accepted, the control of rent-seeking is more easily 
accomplished within an institutional framework guided by political principles 
which limit the power of governmental structures. In fact, the principal issue at 
stake is the question of the viability of attaining democratic ideals in the light of 
numerous practical constraints. On the basis of the above arguments which point 
to the harmful effects of excessive State power, the following analysis will assign 
primacy to ways of limiting coercion, especially by the State. Otherwise, as is 
argued, the centralisation of unfettered power will lead to a disproportionate 
share of resources being allocated to specific interest groups. Ultimately, this is 
seen as causing a decline in the growth of the economy. 
4.1 DEMOCRACY: LIBERAL OR POPULIST? 
In the run-up to a post-apartheid South Africa, many terms and concepts are used 
as if objective, universally accepted definitions existed for them. A case in point 
is the confusion which surrounds even the term democracy. This confusion 
results principally from the fact that, first, democracy refers to a method of 
resolving questions of social choice, and second, it represents the embodiment of 
an ideal(s). It is widely accepted that that a distillation to its essentials reveals that 
democracy has three basic components: (voluntary) participation, liberty and 
justice. Yet, from such apparently clear and objective observations come rather 
complex and sometimes surprising results. For example, if participation (voting) 
is seen as the crucial element in democracy, the result may be that institutions 
which we approve of collectively (democratically) are sterile in that they do not 
satisfy the other conditions of liberty and justice. A crucial aspect of this problem 
emerges from the confusion which stems from a misunderstanding of the distinc-
tion between collective and individual rights and freedoms (Hayek, 1960: 13-15). 
The discussion that follows is derived from examining two different interpreta-
tions of democracy: liberal versus populist (Riker, 1982). The differences which 
shall be probed are those which emerge from different perspectives on the 
anticipated end e.g., freedom and/or liberty, and the means (voting) of achieving 
the end. A theory of 'populist democracy' implies that democratic ends are best 
4 7 
approximated by a few simple arrangements for balloting. By contrast, a theory 
of'liberal democracy' implies that rule by any majority will fail to secure the ends 
of equal liberty. Populist democracy (MacPherson, 1979:93-115) envisages that 
freedom will emerge from participation in government which involves electing 
officials whose actions can reflect the will of the people. The exercise of one's 
(universal) franchise right is the manner in which the common will is revealed. An 
inherent tendency of populist democracy is seen as an orientation toward 
interventionism and concentrated political power. Such an orientation provides 
extended incentives for rent-seeking which diverts scarce economic resources 
from other, more productive activities. Under these conditions, there will be 
greater opportunities for interest coalitions to induce the State to grant to them 
contrived monopolies. Such 'rent-seeking' behaviour, which provides legally 
sanctioned monopoly profits, is generally accepted as being iniquitous to social 
welfare (Colander, 1984). 
While both theories may claim that equal liberty is an ideal, the individualistic-
democratic methodology of liberal democracy demands that a priority be placed 
upon this ideal by limiting coercion, whether by the State, by other groups, or by 
individuals. Coercive political means are identified which need to be avoided in 
order to promote individual liberties. Further, voting is viewed not simply in terms 
of participation to legitimise a government. In a liberal democratic context, 
voting is also seen as an important means of protecting freedom through 
(re)election and limited tenure of office holders. Those who offend voters must 
be at risk of losing an election. An inherent distrust of collective action is 
embodied within liberal democratic principles which would serve to inhibit rent-
seeking behaviour. 
In the subsequent analysis, numerous procedural flaws of populism will be 
identified and explored. An important conclusion which emerges is that populist 
democracy is consistent with an institutional framework which is most amenable 
to rent-seeking and authoritarianism. While many of these same implementation 
problems arise in all forms of democracy, they are exaggerated under populist 
democracy. Alternatively, the structure of institutions is examined with the aim 
of minimising problems associated with the procedural flaws and implementation 
of populist democracy. 
Upon identifying these various problems in the populist model of democracy, an 
alternative constitutional framework based upon liberal democracy will be 
prescribed. Adherents of populist democracy are likely to seek innovations 
which prompt an enlarged political intrusion into the lives and livelihoods of 
citizens. Under liberal democracy an alternative set of rules is proposed with the 
4 8 
intention of constraining the actions of the State. 
4.2 POPULIST DEMOCRACY 
As suggested above, populism purposively submerges individual rights into 
collective ones. Although the arguments need not be detailed here, it is worth 
pointing out that Rousseau's populist concept of government has been identified 
as the source of, and apology for, not only socialism but also the modern 
totalitarian state (Talmon 1952). Populist claims are in fact consistent with a broad 
range of variations of democracy - authoritarian, totalitarian, and otherwise. 
Hayek (1972, III: 128-152) warns of the dangers of 'unlimited democracy', 
especially associated with centralised political power. 
Populist views lend themselves to increased encroachment of the use of political 
institutions in place of, say, the market, to determine economic outcomes. This 
momentum towards 'unlimited democracy' comes at the expense of voluntary as-
sociations. Without checks, these encroachments continue to undermine, and 
threaten complete eradication of, the protection of individuals from State 
coercion. 
4.2.1 The Institutional Outcomes of Populist Democracy and The Free-
dom Charter 
An important and informative vision of the political economy of post-apartheid 
South Africa underpins both the Freedom Charter and its sister document, the 
draft constitution of the African National Congress (ANC). The following set of 
arguments examines the principles reflected in the content as well as those 
implicit in the drafting of these documents. The remarks are aimed specifically 
at providing insights into the evolving demands for a new political dispensation 
for South Africa. 
It will be maintained that the political essence of the Freedom Charter is based 
upon a populist philosophy which is encumbered by numerous difficulties and 
limitations. The criticisms presented here are crucial inasmuch as the demands 
embodied in the Freedom Charter could be embraced in future proposals 
emanating from various extra-parliamentary opposition movements. Wide de-
viation from the Freedom Charter could place its supporters, the so-called 
Charterist groups, e.g., the United Democratic Front and the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions, in a political wilderness and perhaps cause irredeemable 
rifts in the extra-parliamentary opposition. 
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Examination of the ANC's draft constitution confirms its consistency with the 
Freedom Charter. The populist pedigree of the draft constitution is revealed in 
the first paragraph which calls for a unitary state. By implication, the form of the 
envisaged State is one of centralised and concentrated political power. A 
conspicuous priority is placed upon democratic procedures rather than freedom 
per se. While certain rights are described, aside from the expected inclusion of 
an unspecified Bill of Rights, discussion of guarantees of freedom only appears 
once in the entire document. It must be recognised that participation in 
democratic procedures (free and periodic elections; open franchise; open entry 
for parties, candidates and interests; majority or plurality voting rules) does not 
by itself provide effective guarantees from exploitation (Buchanan, 1987:8). The 
maintenance of security and liberty requires explicit protection from coercion. 
This should be obvious given the large number of despotic socialist regimes as well 
as constitutional and democratic 'tyrannies' that exist, including the South 
African State in its present form. 
4.2.2 The Historical and Political Heritage of the Freedom Charter 
The Freedom Charter is probably one of the most important and influential 
political documents ever drawn up in South Africa, and has become a focal point 
of political statements which constitute a widely-held notion of how to direct the 
country in the aftermath of apartheid. It is unquestionably true that much of the 
debate over the future of South African politics is bound up in the rhetoric and 
baggage associated with the Freedom Charter. Drafted by a People's Congress, 
it is claimed that it is based upon a broad canvassing of the populace of South 
Africa. However, it contains demands for a variety of sometimes conflicting 
freedoms. 
Nonetheless, the significance of the Freedom Charter may lie in its historical 
placement and in the emotive support it attracts rather than in its capacity to serve 
as an explicit constitutional model. This latter point is underscored by the draft 
constitution offered by the ANC which articulates its vision of an appropriate 
legal framework. Apparently this move was to redirect the debate within the 
context of a workable document rather than to haggle over an unworkable one. 
Also, the ANC's document provided an important opportunity for its constitutional 
views to be assessed by friend and foe. 
The debate over the viability of the Freedom Charter ranges from a censorious 
view that it is-a blueprint for socialism to a supporting view that its validity lies in 
the fact that it reflects the will of the people. The naivete of these various views 
renders them subject to serious challenge. It is surprising that it is not clear to all 
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who have read the Charter that it favours neither capitalism nor socialism at the 
explicit expense of the other. The point missed by the opposing sides in this 
discussion is not the intent of the authors nor the precise wording of the Charter. 
Rather, the more important task is to discern whether the implied means 
embraced by the Freedom Charter (populist democracy) can deliver the free-
doms demanded and whether, in particular, it can restrain rent-seeking. 
4.2.3 Populism, Apartheid and the Freedom Charter 
It is ironic that the opponents of the apartheid regime use a similar line of 
reasoning which serves as the apology for the political positioning of the National 
Party and its race-based policies. The political myths which are used to legitimise 
the National Party are embodied in this view of populist democracy. The artificial 
constraints on the franchise in South Africa notwithstanding, the centralisation 
of power and development of policy to reflect the will of the (white) 'majority' are 
consistent with the means of populist democracy, whatever the disagreement 
over specific policies. 
Given that populism serves such diverse ends, and if these ideals as expressed in 
the Freedom Charter are illusory, then its unsuspecting adherents risk travelling 
down a foreseeably treacherous road. There are also problems of incongruities 
and internal contradictions in the wording and demands of the Charter; however, 
it will be left to the reader to discern these. A more important point which is 
addressed here relates to the promises and failures of populist democracy which 
provides the political basis of the Freedom Charter. 
The term populism or populist democracy used here reflects reasoning consistent 
with a specific concept of freedom, i.e., positive liberty (Berlin, 1969). That is: (a) 
there exists a general will of the people which (b) can be observed, which in turn 
(c) must be reflected in social policy so that (d) the people are freed through the 
incorporation of their will in the law. 
Thus, it should be seen that the process of drafting the Freedom Charter, its 
wording and the rhetoric of its supporters are the outcome of at least an implicit 
embrace of populist democracy. However, as will be proposed below, support for 
this 'people's mandate ' is based upon questionable, perhaps spurious, arguments. 
This claim of spuriousness is not meant to assert that its stated ends are unworthy 
but rather that the ends are impossible to attain. In other words, populist 
democracy is neither equated to, nor does it necessarily generate, popular control 
of governments. 
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In the first instance, there are serious questions about whether the general will is 
merely a formal concept or if it has any empirical content. Secondly, if it is granted 
that this collective preference exists, the means for revealing it are at best severely 
limited and subject to numerous and perhaps insurmountable problems. Finally, 
the fallibility and unavoidable subjectivity of the values of the agents who must 
interpret and implement this will are a non-trivial consideration. An alarming 
prospect is that acquiescence to the populist principles behind the Freedom 
Charter may lead logically to the type of authoritarianism which the framers were 
seeking to remedy. 
4.2.4 Summary of the Implementation Failures of Populism 
The characteristics of populist democracy and the populist process are discussed 
in Appendix A. The arguments there suggest serious flaws in the promises 
embodied in a populist democracy, viz, that positive freedom can be secured 
through democratic impulses to legislative bodies in order to enact a general will. 
Voting merely identifies a winner among those alternatives offered without 
revealing whether another outcome might in fact be more preferred. Acceptance 
of the myth of the populist ideal leaves the way open for a duly elected ruler to 
proclaim a mandate reflecting the people's will and, empowered by that mandate, 
to act in terms of what is asserted to be the collective will. 
Citizens' demands for constraints on officials elected under populism will be 
viewed as intolerable obstructions which can be ignored or perhaps forcibly 
removed. Politics under populist democracy can easily degenerate to a support 
for the will of the few rather than the will of the many. The logic behind both the 
Freedom Charter and the ANC draft constitution could readily allow for the 
emergence of another constitutional dictatorship, not unlike what South Africa 
has at present. An unaccountable one-party democracy is but a populist fantasy. 
By recognising that the Freedom Charter (and the ANC's draft constitution) is 
based upon the concept of populist democracy, the harmful, unintended conse-
quences of the implicit oppression can be avoided and the harmful effects of rent-
seeking can be limited. 
Here it might be useful to raise a very difficult question concerning the granting 
of a universal franchise. There are two separate issues concerning the rights and 
responsibilities of voting. First, the franchise must be extended with a minimum 
of qualifications, e.g., age restrictions but, second, the question of the limits which 
need be placed upon those issues which will be resolved on the basis of a political 
poll must be addressed. This point is discussed in Section 4.4. 
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4.2.5 Populism and the Advance of a Rent-seeking Mentality 
The essence of the political problem in this analysis has been consistently 
identified as State intervention, especially in the form of granting monopoly rights 
as manifested in legislation to regulate or to licence certain activities. Problems 
arise owing to the concomitant political insecurity concerning the politicised 
factors which determine the distribution of income and wealth. Under such 
conditions of uncertainty, politically inspired pressures emerge to demand an 
influence or control of non-economic factors as a means of manipulating eco-
nomic outcomes. Impersonal mechanisms like the market give way to command-
determined outcomes. Apartheid, although it seems to be a worst-case scenario 
of politically determined incomes, is but one variation of a general problem. New 
distributional coalitions are likely to replace old ones, for example, black trade 
unions, urban workers, political party members, and bureaucrats. 
It can be seen, then, that populism is consistent with (a) the enlargement of State 
structures and (b) an increased tendency to resort to the conscious manipulation 
of economic positions on the basis of majority rule. Increases in the spheres of 
State activity and intervention undermine the framework of a free society by 
threatening the economic foundations of liberal democracy (Hayek, 1978: 105-
118). South Africans are well aware that private ownership of printing presses 
does not guarantee freedom of the press. Conversely, it is just as clear that if the 
State controls the instruments of printing, it is certain that press freedom will not 
exist. Likewise, if meeting rooms are controlled there can be no freedom of 
assembly, and there will be no freedom of movement if the means of transport are 
controlled (Hayek, 1978: 149). Whatever the State provides financing for, it 
ultimately controls. 
4.3 LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
Usher (1981) provides historical evidence that all liberal democracies have been 
based upon a predominantly capitalistic economy. He further observes that 
radical shifts in the mode of production, e.g., toward a planned economy, have led 
to the destruction of liberal institutions. For example, 'bourgeois rights' tend to 
be denounced or destroyed and the 'untidiness' of the political competition of 
multi-party democracy is often replaced by a more 'orderly' one-party state. 
Finally, politicisation of social and economic processes adds increased uncer-
tainty and contributes to economic instability. In turn, destabilisation of the 
economic base reduces the prospects for economic growth. 
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3.1 Liberal Democracy and Power for People 
Liberal democracy is not consistent with every system of majority rule. Whereas 
majority rule and collective rights are the focus of positive liberty and populist 
democracy, the rights and freedoms of the individual are paramount to the 
concept of negative liberty and liberal democracy. 
There are further requirements which include limits on the process of political 
dispensation consistent with a different definition of freedom, i.e., negative 
freedom (Berlin, 1969), which demands a minimum of coercion and is associated 
with the work of John Locke. Individual rights and liberty require protection both 
from the State and also from infringements based upon majority decisions 
(Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 5). 
Many of the failings of populist democracy can be avoided by adherence to liberal 
democratic prescriptions. Whether such an heroic leap is justified relates to the 
importance attached to individual freedom and whether one's accepted sense of 
justice is compatible with a populist-collectivist framework. In all events, liberal 
democracy does imply a much greater chance for removal/replacement of 
politicians or parties from power. 
The above analysis provides a crucial background for understanding the possible 
future course for South Africa. The flaws in democracy are great, but are greatest 
perhaps in populist democracy. Nevertheless, counting heads is better than 
breaking them, and democracy - this fallible system revered by so many - remains 
our best means for a peaceful transition of power. Yet it must be remembered also 
that democracy is most effective when political factions are encouraged. Some 
amount of factionalism is needed to restrain majorities. Political competition is 
just as important to an effective democracy as is economic competition to the 
market. After all, majorities are simply coalitions of minorities and will be 
transient only if factions compete for power. 
4.3.2 Power for People Requires Restraints upon Governments 
Legislative and electoral politics involve problems which either lead to excessive 
growth of the public sector or contribute to an erosion of democratic principles. 
For example, bureaucracies are not passive actors: bureaucrats play an active 
role in determining the size of government budgets to fulfil their utility maximisa-
tion. Also, the pressures of electoral competition will induce politicians to direct 
a disproportionate share of resources towards well-organised, special-interest 
groups. 
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These problems will be exacerbated within a government based upon populist 
democracy. An alternative framework consistent with liberal democracy pro-
poses: 
fa) political structures which aim to limit the concentration of power to any 
v ruling clique, 
(b) constitutional constraints on the fiscal process, 
(c) reform of bureaucracies, and 
(d) decentralisation of political power. 
These are discussed in Appendix B. 
In following these prescriptions, individuals can gain greater control over fiscal 
and political affairs which, though part of the intent contained in the populist 
philosophy behind the Freedom Charter, is an unlikely result. It is important to 
understand that democracy was never intended to be an unlimited, anything-
goes, free-for-all. Responsible democrats accept that stability and progress 
require that the temptation to enjoy the spoils of power is both inevitable and 
almost impossible to resist due to constituent pressures, individual temptations 
notwithstanding. 
4.4 RENT-SEEKING AND CENTRALISATION OF POLITICAL POWER 
Lord Acton warned that power tends to corrupt and absolute power tends to 
corrupt absolutely. Power for people is only meaningful if individuals' rights to 
remove office-holders through voting can be guaranteed. Power for people 
comes through restraints upon the State and its agents whether by removing their 
power to detain individuals without trial or limiting their ability to confiscate/ 
nationalise private property. Sovereignty of the individual will be greatest with 
devolution of power in a unified but not unitary state. The populist origins and 
content of the Freedom Charter (and the ANC's draft constitution) present the 
danger of an unintended continuation of the current authoritarian-type rule and 
an extension of rent-seeking. 
The most serious indictment of populism would seem to be that apartheid is 
consistent with a particularly perverse populist interpretation of democracy. A 
political 'majority', in a situation of limited franchise, has been able to operate 
within a form of representative democracy to impose its will and legally transform 
a numerical majority into a powerless political 'minority'. On the other hand, 
rent-seeking allows an economic minority to impose the costs of narrowly 
beneficial public programmes upon the majority of society. 
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A peculiar set of problems emerges in the quest for a broad constituency to 
support the implementation of a model which so severely circumscribes the 
power of the State. After so much suffering which was coincidental with a lack 
of political rights and power, a black majority may be loath to accept that, upon 
acquiring the reins of power, this power would be so greatly diminished. However 
this aversion to the diminution of political power in the hands of the majority 
requires a slight change in perceptions, perhaps a more refined understanding of 
the shortcomings and failures of representative democracy. It is of paramount 
importance that the rationale behind the model of liberal democracy be to 
restrain the actions of any majoritarian government, not merely to enfeeble a 
prospective black majority. 
Such loathing might be remedied if the implications of the previous argument are 
accepted, that is, that the essential problem of apartheid is not that the minority 
lacks access to power. The arguments presented in this paper suggest that the 
essential problem of power under the apartheid regime was that there was too 
much power concentrated at the centre combined with the profound disregard 
for freedom of the individual from coercion and State exploitation. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Despite the practical lessons learned by the socialist economies, there are several 
ideological camps in South Africa which remain predisposed toward massive 
redistribution and socialisation of resources by future governments. In these days 
of perestroika and glasnost, such models of a post-apartheid South Africa seem 
strangely outdated. With the odd exceptions in Albania, Cuba and a few other 
countries, there is a drift toward more market-orientated economies and away 
from State interventions. In any case, the arguments presented above lay the 
blame for the injustices of apartheid at the feet of an interventionist-orientated 
political system. Neither the abuses of power of political regimes nor their ill-
fated economic results are dependent upon any particular economic framework 
or attitude toward private property rights. Following this line of argument, the 
excesses of apartheid are not inescapably linked to the operation of the market 
as supposed by the radical-Marxian models. 
This present study provides a new framework for examining the historical and 
causal determinants of apartheid. Rather than relying upon the loosely framed 
concept of racial capitalism, a general model has been offered which explains the 
rise and decline of apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism. The generality of the 
model is seen in its ability to analyse past, present and future (post-apartheid) 
developments. Neither revolution nor reform will effectively change the nature 
of the injustices within South Africa unless there is a fundamental shift away from 
centralised public intervention which allows for and encourages the ravages of 
rent-seeking. 
The arguments presented above differ from and supersede the previous liberal-
radical debate on the economic causes and consequences of apartheid. An 
institutionally-orientated analysis of the behaviour of individuals, in response to 
rent-seeking opportunities, provides a more general model to explain the inter-
relationships between economic and political behaviour. For example, the 
economic theory of rent-seeking can be applied to explain interest-coalition 
behaviour of the nomenklatura and apparatchiks in the Soviet Union as well as 
within liberal (and not-so-liberal) democracies. 
Neither side of the liberal-radical debate has examined the likelihood of the 
survival of the gross inefficiencies and injustices which are normally associated 
with the present apartheid regime. In fact, as asserted here, the principal 
problems associated with apartheid, i.e., unreasonable restrictions upon individ-
ual choice, can be anticipated to survive. The 'ethic' of State intervention per se, 
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is quite likely to outlive the current regime since it is reflected in the populist 
tendencies of both the Freedom Charter and the ANC's draft constitution. 
Up to the present, the development of institutions in South Africa has followed 
a course similar to that taken post-independence by its African neighbours, i.e., 
institutional arrangements which encourage rent-seeking instead of profit-seek-
ing. Most developing countries with former colonial attachments have carried on 
the system of privilege and sinecures associated with their reviled colonial 
masters. 
To avoid continuation of the universally recognised inefficiencies and injustices 
which are generally associated with apartheid, and in the absence of implicit 
cultural restraints, explicit institutional, e.g., constitutional, restrictions upon 
rent-seeking behaviour must be designed and implemented. Recent net improve-
ments in the economic position of blacks have been the result of institutional 
changes, e.g., deregulation, which have promoted profit-seeking as a means of 
enrichment in place of rent-seeking. The development of appropriate institu-
tional frameworks would encourage profit-seeking and a social surplus rather 
than the social waste generated by rent-seeking. 
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APPENDIX A - PROBLEMS OF 
POPULIST DEMOCRACY 
A.1 DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF POPULIST DEMOC-
RACY 
A.1.1 Questions Concerning the Concept of General Will 
Objections concerning the existence of a general will can be raised on subjectivist/ 
individualist grounds. Associated with these objections is an epistemological 
problem, namely, what Hayek (1945) identifies as the knowledge problem. Hayek 
questions whether it is possible for such information to be gathered let alone to 
be assimilated by one mind when such intelligence is derived from so many 
individual sources. Claims of the existence of such a 'harmony of rational wills' 
seems a dubious claim, or at best it is a concept which is made extremely slippery 
by the effect of time upon changing tastes, ideas and knowledge. Even if a 
momentary indication were possible, it would have no permanent validity. 
A.1.2 Epistemological Problems and the General Will 
The analysis continues from the above premise that individual value systems are 
subjectively chosen. These values are also in a constant state of flux due to the 
unforeseeable availability of new information which becomes part of the individ-
ual's calculation process (LaVoie, 1985: 51-92). Therefore, knowledge of means 
and ends is both widely dispersed and unstable over time. These two character-
istics of knowledge and its formation make it impossible for one mind or a sub-set 
of minds to interpret a consistent general will. This is not merely a technical prob-
lem to be overcome by super-computers; it implies that in a dynamic setting, it is 
impossible to carry out a compilation of knowledge in a useable and concentrated 
form (LaVoie, 1985: 85). (This same argument can be extended and applied as 
a non-normative indictment of the efficacy of centralised decision-making.) 
Information used by politicians and planners of necessity reflects a generally 
static and merely a narrow set of interests. Aggregation by its very nature assumes 
away differences, seeks a common denominator and ignores important dispari-
ties in the quality and quantity of information which is nonetheless available to 
each concerned individual actor. To worsen matters, the institutionalisation (bu-
reaucratisation) of a particular solution in the form of public policy, tends towards 
inflexibility and slow adaptation to change. Such problems are compounded 
further by the infrequent voicing of preferences under representative democracy. 
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A.1.3 Problems of Revealed Social Preference 
Problems of social preferences also emerge from a pragmatic rather than an epis-
temological perspective. Suppose that a general will does exist. Certainly, a 
precondition for the full promise of populist democracy to be met is that there 
must be a means of revealing and interpreting such collective preferences, e.g., 
voting in some form or another. Crucial fallacies in the populist ideal will be 
revealed by examining well-known conclusions drawn from the theory of social 
choice, also known as the theory of voting (Bonner, 1986). 
The first and most conspicuous complication arises in how to select the best 
voting rule. It should be transparent that the selection of the voting rule will affect 
the outcome of any vote just as much as would control of the agenda. Unfortu-
nately no objective standard exists to inform us which scheme best reveals the 
supposed general will. There is not even a consensus on what are the appropriate 
ends to be served by the best scheme. For example, should it be most efficient or 
least costly or be least vulnerable to strategic voting or voting cycles? 
The issue of voting cycles relates to a situation where majority- rule elections of 
issues/candidates are unable to reveal a clear, consistent winner. In such 
situations the outcome substantially can be determined not by the expression of 
the members of the electorate but predetermined by the person(s) who sets the 
electoral agenda (Holcombe, 1985: 49-52). 
These disappointing predictions suggest inconsistent results and paradoxes 
which will depend upon, among other things, vote-trading and manipulation of 
the agenda. Vote-trading or strategic voting occurs, e.g., when a voter selects a 
second-best alternative when the preferred option has little or no chance of 
winning. Similarly, a simple case of agenda manipulation occurs when the 
generally preferred opposing candidate/issue is excluded from the ballot. A more 
extreme case involves the listing of a single candidate/issue, as in many one-party 
states. In neither instance can the revealed preferences possibly reflect the so-
called general will. 
An electoral process is unlikely to guarantee the discovery of a citizen's entire set 
of preferences or the specific ranking or the relative intensities of such prefer-
ences. Even if these results could be observed, they would be subject to subjective 
interpretation by whomsoever would be charged with such a duty. Unless one 
accepts that public officials act only in a well-defined sense of public interest, the 
construction of political institutions based upon such interpretations involves 
substantial risks. 
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Just as there are numerous voting rules which might be utilised to determine 
social preferences, there are numerous strategies which individual voters might 
pursue. The most familiar of the former are majoritarian, plurality, or unanimity 
voting rules. (Many other more complex rules can be suggested, but these more 
familiar ones should suffice for the present discussion). The latter involves log-
rolling or vote-trading among other strategies which tend to obscure rather than 
reveal the true preferences of voters. 
It should be clear that conventional democratic procedures are best suited to the 
task of merely settling issues which involve one-dimensional questions such as 
whether to increase or decrease expenditures upon covert military activities. The 
more difficult and normally more interesting questions (in the previous example, 
whether covert activities should be funded at all!) are not easily settled with a 
normal ballot. More complex issues require more discussion, even compromise, 
than allowed by a binary, yes-no selection. Oversimplified lumping of complex 
political issues is most likely to emerge in a unitary system as demanded in the 
populist framework. 
A.1.4 Populist Democracy and Centralist Tendencies 
Inherent in the implied model of populist democracy is a tendency toward 
centralisation of government functions. The development of centralised bureau-
cratic structures and the complementary collectivist impulses are likely (in the 
absence of explicit constraints to the contrary) to involve an ever-broadening set 
of inhibitions upon individual actions. 
Many of these inhibitions are prompted by claims for economic as well as political 
equality. Much State intervention is justified on the basis that the enjoyment of 
equal rights is vitiated by economic inequalities, especially in the case of gross 
inequalities. Populist democracy is thus compatible with,and in fact encourages, 
the type of centralisation of economic processes which are characteristic of 
socialism. Unfortunately, this logic is also capable of providing an apology for 
extreme cases of, for example, despotic socialism with massive State intervention 
in every aspect of life. 
A.2 AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY FORMATION 
The final stage of the populist process requires an effective implementation of 
public policy as a reflection of the general will. Developments in public choice 
theory reveal that neither benign nor beneficial outcomes derived from rational, 
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democratic choice processes can be taken for granted (McLean, 1987). Public 
choice theory has provided extensive analysis of political behaviour in represen-
tative democracies. As discussed in Section 2, this is accomplished by treating 
politics as a process of exchange and extending the familiar assumption of 
individual maximising behaviour to include political agents. For example, politi-
cians and their parties are modelled to behave as vote maximisers. This 'vote 
motive' model reveals critical complications in the process of political represen-
tation (Tullock, 1976). In particular, public choice theory has revealed how 
individual motivation will hinder political processes and government programmes 
from operating in an efficient (Pareto optimal) manner. 
In a representative democracy, voters' preferences are indicated through a 
process where elected representatives select policies which are meant continu-
ously to reflect the will of the constituency. Public choice theory points to a 
number of weaknesses in the links between voters and their interests and the 
selection of public policy by their representatives (Buchanan, 1978). Many, if not 
most, of these breakdowns in the transmission of citizens' preferences into public 
policy are simply a limiting function of representative democracy. The transmis-
sion failures imply serious flaws in the use of democratic procedures to generate 
socially desired outcomes. 
A.2.1 Rational Ignorance and Political Participation 
In the democratic process citizens will exercise rational choice (cost/benefit 
comparison) and remain ignorant of certain or even most political issues. While 
such choices to remain ignorant also emerge in a market setting, the absorption 
of direct costs by the individual chooser provides a 'natural' check on such 
behaviour. In a political setting rational ignorance is likely to create more 
pervasive costs and so substantially weaken the link between voters' preferences 
and the final outcome of political decisions. In particular, rational ignorance 
makes citizens easy prey for politicians, for example, who disguise their views on 
a particular issue before a potentially critical audience in a bid to win their support 
while shifting positions later before another, different set of constituents. Such 
poorly informed voters are not likely to generate a meaningful indication of a 
general will due to their own rational choice pattern. 
On the other hand, the unwillingness to cast one's vote (voter apathy) can be 
understood partly in terms of an opting out of the necessary efforts for improving 
political literacy. While it is considered with alarm by other social scientists, the 
apparent apathy is seen by many economists as nothing more than rational, 
calculating behaviour. In fact, one paradox of voting implies that large-number 
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elections reduce the incentive to vote (Mueller, 1987). Given the low probability 
of one's vote affecting the outcome, the costs (queuing, information costs) will 
outweigh expected benefits of voting. Thus, many well-informed individuals will 
find it, on balance, simply too 'costly' to go to the polls despite the minimal 
requirement of outlays of time and effort. Perhaps an equally interesting question 
might concern why so many, not so few, people bother to vote in a large-number 
election. A Catch-22 situation may exist since it could be argued that those who 
do not vote are actually more knowledgeable about political processes than those 
who do! These transparent ill-effects of political illiteracy and low levels of 
participation are likely to be compounded due to carefully manipulated election-
eering of opportunistic politicians who must attract the most votes to remain in 
or to gain public office. 
A.2.2 Special Interest Coalitions 
Special interest groups compound the above problems (McCormick and Tollison 
1981). Due to the concentration of benefits of a policy for a particular group, and 
given the wide dispersal of associated costs, e.g., agricultural price support 
schemes, interest groups are able to capture a disproportionate share of political 
influence. The consequence of such political lobbying is that economic resources 
are directed toward a political minority at the expense of the majority. Interest 
coalitions have a much greater incentive to organise voting blocks in contrast to 
the mass of ordinary consumers who are unorganised and who thus individually 
face a low cost of (and hence small payoff from opposition to) such politically 
determined redistributions (Olson 1971). 
The politician in a representative democracy will be well aware of how the vote 
can be used as an instrument of punishment (reward) by special interests for 
ignoring (supporting) them. Thus, politicians are vulnerable to well-organised 
pressures since the requirement to attract votes is so strong that it overrides other 
considerations (Anderson and Hill, 1980). The nexus between voters' prefer-
ences and the actions and accountability of democratically elected politicians can 
be tenuous indeed. 
A.2.3 The Modern Economic Theory of Bureaucracy 
This section expands some of the points made in Section 2.2.2 above. Bureauc-
racy is yet another source of disequilibrium in the democratic process. A modern 
theory of bureaucracy replaces an outmoded and naive public-interest notion of 
the behaviour of public officials and assumes them to be like other maximising, 
self-interested individuals (Niskanen 1971). Their behaviour is then analysed in 
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a game-theoretic context where the players are identified as the bureaux and their 
sponsors. 
Bureaucrats are expected to pursue their own interests perhaps indirectly by 
serving the interests of lobby groups which petition them. Incomes to bureauc-
racies are based upon neither sale of output nor profits. Without an objective 
measure of performance, the sponsor (usually a government) will be dependent 
upon the bureaucracy for information concerning budgetary requirements. 
Economists refer to such a situation as a bilateral monopoly. The sponsor has 
control over the purse strings yet the bureaucracy has a monopoly over relevant 
information. 
In such a game-theoretic, strategic setting, individuals in a bureaucracy are able 
to 'capture' the sponsor and provide only such information as will lead the budget 
setters to maximise the size of the bureau, and thus their budgets. Budget 
maximisation is likely since it is consistent with most other motives of individual 
bureaucrats. For example, budget maximisation will enhance prestige, job 
security, salaries and perquisites. Parliamentarians charged with reponsibility for 
budget approval are at a disadvantage in attempts to control bureaucracies due 
to a comparative disadvantage in access to information and lack of expertise in 
the details of the bureaucracies' functions. Bureaucrats will find it an easy task 
to furnish confounding arguments against attempts to reduce their budgets. If 
this model is accurate then it will be likely that the anticipated benefits to the 
public will fall short of the actual costs of maintaining a given bureaucratic 
structure. 
In summary, the characteristic result of the provision of goods by bureaucratic 
structures tends towards: (a) over-supply and an internal inertia for bureau 
growth, and (b) a waste of resources through process inefficiency due to a 
'defective' incentive structure. 
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APPENDIX B - LIBERAL P R E S C R I P T I O N S FOR 
CONSTRAINING UNLIMITED DEMOCRACY 
The substance of the Freedom Charter has been argued to lie within the 
weaknesses inherent in the populist ideals reflected in that document. For 
instance, epistemological arguments challenge the premise of a practical notion 
of general will. Secondly, evidence from the theory of voting casts doubts on the 
results and durability of populist-based expressions. Finally, it can be shown that 
there are substantial weaknesses in the links between voters' preferences and the 
formation of public policy. Neither politicians nor bureaucrats can be expected 
to act selflessly (as 'economic eunuchs') or solely in the interests of the public. 
Even if their intentions are 'pure' there is no guarantee that the results will be a 
clear reflection of collective preferences as is the intention behind representative 
democracy. 
Arguments concerning these weaknesses must be taken seriously. If they are 
upheld, they must be taken into account within any blueprint for a post-apartheid 
framework in order to obviate the continuation of the type of exploitation 
familiar under the current regime. 
Individual freedom and protection from exploitative coercion are assigned 
primacy in a liberal democratic framework for several reasons. Most important, 
both equality and justice are slippery concepts. The relativism of justice is 
obvious if one considers that, undoubtedly, antagonists on each side of every war 
or conflict were convinced they were fighting for a just cause (Albert, 1987: 73). 
Problems of this relativism are compounded when considering the interde-
pendency between justice and equality. Ross (1958: 270) points out that, "...the 
demand for equality must...be understood in a relative sense, that is, as a demand 
that like shall be treated in a like manner. This means that as a prerequisite for the 
application of the norm of equality, and independent of it, there must be some 
criteria to determine what is to be considered as equal". Since both justice and 
equality can be interpreted in any number of ways, political entrepreneurs can 
provide different definitions which will have substantially different results for the 
social order. 
One of the greatest temptations of modern representative governments is to 
apply standards of distributive justice and to implement policies to prosecute this 
ideal. (One of the conclusions of public choice theory is that much of what passed 
off as redistribution to serve the 'public interest' is simply redistribution to favour 
some special interest group.) This 'welfarist' mentality has been encouraged by 
neo-classical economic analysis of so-called market failures. Under special 
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conditions, e.g., 'natural' monopoly, externalities, and public goods, State inter-
vention was both necessary and sufficient to correct these failures. Political 
agents were assumed to be both omniscient and selfless. However, it has been 
argued above that either power is likely to be subverted to serve the narrow ends 
of politicians, or the rent-seeking behaviour of special interest groups will lead to 
an instability and greater uncertainty of an individual's economic position. Profit-
seeking is discouraged and entrepreneurial energies are directed instead toward 
rent-seeking, i.e., the development of politically contrived monopoly rights 
(Holcombe, 1983). Instead of market determination of income and ownership, 
economic outcomes become politicised and subject to majoritarian whims. 
One particular aspect of the 'welfarist' mentality is the imposition of distributive 
justice over commutative (civil) justice, i.e., justice of property rights (Vaubel, 
1987:95). Distributive justice involves justice of giving (taking) within a collective 
organisation in order to achieve a selected pattern of distribution. The focus is 
not upon the justness of rules or procedures but upon the justness of outcomes 
or end-states. 
Commutative justice is consistent with a protective State rather than the type of 
interventionist State required to prosecute distributive justice (Ibid.). The logical 
structure of commutative justice is a set of 'negative' rules prohibiting actions 
which infringe upon the liberty of others. Three basic principles underpin 
commutative justice: (1) compensation for damage, (2) inviolability of property, 
and (3) freedom of contract. The costs of distributive justice are reflected in the 
violations of these principles as summarised below. 
A special problem relating to the consequences of redistribution and State 
intervention is that political assignment of either income or an individual's 
economic position in society can be expected to lead to: 
(a) economic organisations which are no longer consistent with continuation of 
democratic government (Usher 1981), and 
(b) the^decline in the capacity for economic growth (Olson, 1982; Mueller, 
In the light of these problems of 'public policy failure', it has become more 
apparent that constitutions must be devised which safeguard individual rights and 
freedoms from arbitrary government. Therefore, effective restraints need to be 
placed upon the exercise of the political (majoritarian-utilitarian) determination 
of individuals' incomes to overcome the instability and attendant distortions upon 
economic behaviour. Such distortions are likely to limit private investment 
decisions and thus reduce real economic growth. In the absence of restraints on 
political excesses imposed by implicit historical or cultural values, formal rules 
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must be outlined explicitly in a constitution. These steps are designed to limit 
arbitrary encroachments by the State or by an expansion of outcomes which are 
determined by majority rule and which destroy individual rights (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1986; and Hayek, 1982). 
B.1 POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The survival of liberal democracy requires certain political components, e.g., 
multi-cameral legislature, separation of powers ('checks and balances') between 
executive and legislative branches, an independent judiciary, decentralisation 
and division of authority between local and central governments, and limited 
tenure of officials with regular elections under universal suffrage (Riker, 1982: 
142). As it is clear that many of these conditions are present in South Africa, the 
full implementation of these rules is necessary in order to ensure circulation of 
leadership as a means of minimising concentration of power and weakening the 
grasp of entrenched interests. 
B.1.1 Political Arguments for Decentralisation 
Fragmentation of political authority, e.g., a federal model, avoids the numerous 
problems associated with a unitary state. First, a unitary state implies a concen-
tration of power at the centre which is more easily captured and maintained by 
a single set of interests. Second, the clustering of often disparate issues leads to 
oversimplified political balloting. The greater the centralisation of political 
power, the more passive will be the administrative checks on bureaucrats' 
demands for larger budgets. Finally, governmental structures will be forced into 
a competitive situation. In other words, local public goods and services must be 
provided efficiently in relation to the tax charges in order to maintain an adequate 
tax base. Therefore, Wicksellian agreement (unanimity) which mirrors market 
outcomes is more important than cost-benefit definitions of efficiency. Without 
agreement there can be no stability regardless of whether efficiency is obtained. 
B.1.2 Issues Relating to a Bill of Rights 
The abject neglect of rights and freedoms in South Africa is an important part of 
the impetus behind the interest in the concept of a Bill of Rights. However, there 
are some important related issues which require clarification before unqualified 
support may be granted to such a scheme. Interestingly, a National Party 
proposal would, in essence, be very similar to a Bill of Rights formulated by, for 
example, a Charterist group. 
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Both of these formulations would replace the traditional, liberal concept of 
individual rights with social rights. In the event that the Bill of Rights of the US 
Constitution is to serve as a model for South Africa, such a shift violates the basic 
premise of the former. Social or group rights would dilute the meaningful 
assertion of individual rights and freedoms. Collectivist-interventionist concepts 
of 'rights' contradict the ideals of individual liberty and economic freedom. 
Hayek (1982: 111,110) offers another critique of a written Bill of Rights which 
exists without commitment to an ideal of individual freedom. He suggests that 
singling out of certain specific 'rights' for protection in a Bill of Rights implies that, 
in other circumstances, a government may apply coercion without being bound by 
more general rules of law. 
Finally, it is necessary to recognise that a Bill of Rights is merely a document 
drawn up by one particular government which can be altered by a successor. 
Without a commitment to some fundamental precept, e.g., the primacy of 
individual liberty, there is no guarantee of permanence of the protection from 
exploitation which is the unreserved (if undefined) goal of all opposition groups. 
B.2 ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The differences between public choice and neo-classical analysis become quite 
distinct in the subsequent discussion. In the first instance, the attitudes of public 
choice theorists about the ability of functionaries of the State to generate efficient 
outcomes are much influenced by Hayek's work (1945). Hayek highlights the 
limits of the mind due to the fact that the future is quite simply unknowable and 
that information is dispersed and in a constant state of flux since means and ends 
can be known only to each individual. Thus, no single mind nor a subset of minds 
can possess or process an adequate amount of information to satisfy all individual 
goals. 
Electoral competition does not guarantee adequate control over taxing and 
spending policies. To strengthen these political constraints certain economic 
features should also be written into the constitution which determine the State's 
power to attenuate private property rights and how it uses these resources. One 
of the most salient conclusions drawn from the whole of public choice analysis is 
the need for and nature of a fiscal constitution whereby limitations are placed 
upon public authorities' tax and spending decisions (McKenzie, 1984). Constitu-
tionally assigned fiscal limits can take the form of either procedural or quantita-
tive restrictions (Buchanan and Flowers, 1987: 141-49). 
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B.2.1 Procedural Limits 
Such constraints are based upon the indirect control over political decision-
making in order to constrain taxation and outlays through a system of rules and 
procedures. Such rules would moderate the political structure within which fiscal 
decisions are made. For example, qualified majorities might be required for the 
passage of taxing and spending legislation to minimise the potential for fiscal 
exploitation of the majority by minority, special-interest coalitions. A precept of 
fiscal generality would imply favouring proportional, comprehensive schemes of 
income taxation and eliminating much of the lobbying for special tax concessions. 
Balancing of the public-sector budgets will place an important constraint upon 
both taxing and spending. 
Several other questions arise concerning procedural rules which might also be 
addressed under political constitutionalism. It is undoubtedly important to be 
concerned with how changes in these rules occur and who is charged with 
changing them. If such rule changes are based upon a majoritarian outcome, the 
problems associated with representative democracy arise. How often these rules 
might be changed is also of interest since there are some observable benefits 
associated with stability of rules. 
B.2.2 Quantitative Constraints 
Specific limits upon public sector size might be imposed which directly affect the 
prospective results of tax and spending policies. Public outlays and/or revenues 
might be expressed as a specific share of some aggregate measure of the 
performance of the economy, e.g., GDP. 
Constraints on the tax base are another indirect restraint. Following the lead of 
Proposition 13 in California, tax rates could be set at a prescribed limit. Finally, 
the size or proportion of public debt in relation to overall economic activity will 
likewise place constraints on the fiscal operations of the State. 
B.2.3 Reform of Bureaucracies 
A related problem concerns a reform of the nature of bureaucracies to increase 
control over them and to improve their efficiency. Aside from explicit privatisa-
tion, there are several other methods. Niskanen (1971) suggests changing 
incentive structures either in terms of rewards for improved efficiency, e.g., cost 
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cutting, to bureaucrats, contracting out, or full-scale privatisation where appro-
priate. 
B.2.4 Economic Arguments for Decentralisation 
Bureaucracies are easier to control within a decentralised (e.g., federal) system. 
A devolution of power and fragmentation of government operations introduce 
competition into the production of publicly supplied goods and services. Citizens 
have an option which goes beyond the ballot box. They can express their 'exit 
option' and voice their disapproval (Hirschman, 1970) of public-sector goods and 
services relative to the tax levels by 'voting with their feet ' (Tiebout, 1956). In the 
absence of 'group areas'-type restrictions, choice of migration among decentral-
ised jurisdictions provides a carrot and stick effect via the impact upon the tax 
bases. Therefore, it can be argued that decentralisation of political power 
expands freedom of choice and encourages a more efficient operation of 
government agencies. 
The decentralisation argument also relates to the question of a unified state 
which is a catch-word in the 'progressive' vocabulary and which appears in the 
ANC draft constitution. Assuming that the principal intent behind this idea is to 
reunite the whole of South Africa, perhaps a more appropriate term would be a 
unified staite. The goal of reuniting the various bits and pieces do not require that 
the central government be empowered with exclusive sovereignty. In order to 
avoid the concentration of power in a centralised state, a strong case is made for 
the devolution of power within a federal, power-sharing framework. 
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